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ABSTRACT
In recent years, the Chinese government transformed their national system of housing provision and
introduced market mechanisms. The consequent boom in residential real estate development and the
emergence of speculative practices dramatically increased housing prices in cities. Low- and moderate-
income households are being priced out of homeownership. The lack of affordable urban housing is
increasingly framed as an issue of equity that is linked inherently to China's political identity as a
communist nation. As such, the central government is experimenting with policy to address the issue of
affordability in a commercialized housing market. The controversial "70 percent, 90 square meters rule"
is one such policy that has started discussions on the development of mixed income housing. Given the
current policy trend, private developers can reasonably foresee requirements to incorporate affordable
housing in future developments.
The primary purpose of this thesis is to highlight the growing segregation of housing based on income in
China and examine the concept of mixing incomes for future urban housing developments. New luxury
developments in urban centers are clustering high-income households together while spatially separating
them from low- and middle-income households. This thesis does not address how to supply more
affordable housing, but rather examines an alternative that incorporates affordable housing within
otherwise market-rate developments. The initial chapters provide a synopsis of the current urban housing
situation in China as well as the historical housing policies in which it emerged from.
Thereafter, three mixed-income housing developments in Boston, Massachusetts, USA were studied:
Rollins Square, Harbor Point, and the Metropolitan. For each case, factors explored include project
background, income mixture, marketing strategy, financial structure, design and layout, and property
management/operations. The spectrum and resolution of income mixing were examined in detail.
Research conducted includes interviews with developers, property managers, and other project
participants as well as site visits, and reviews of project documentation. Case studies also include an
analysis of critical success factors for each.
The thesis concludes with observations and implications believed to be important to developers and
policy makers contemplating or presently engaged in developing housing in cities across China.
Thesis Supervisor: Tunney Lee
Title: Professor Emeritus, MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning
4
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Given the nature of the topic and nature of case studies, this thesis would not have been possible without
the generous support and cooperation of others. I relied heavily on the experience and insights of many
individuals involved in the field of housing development, as they shared with us their knowledge and
experience. I am especially grateful to the following individuals for their generosity, support,
cooperation, and guidance:
- Tunney Lee, thesis advisor, mentor, and supporter - for your expertise and engaged guidance
throughout the process; thank you so much for all your support and patience.
- Liang Zhao, reader - for your insight and feedback. You helped me thwart disaster.
" China Vanke Group - for graciously opening up your offices and supporting this research; thank you
to the countless staff members who shared the details of their experience and unique insights. I
admire your company's commitment and I humbly submit my research in hopes it may help you in
your endeavors.
- Lisa Alberghini, David Armitage, Sue Johnson - for generously helping me understand what a truly
great project Rollins Square is.
- Waisun and Puiwan Chan - for giving me all that I have. Thank you for your support, patience,
strength, and sacrifice.
- Quinn Eddins, Lu Gao, Emily Lambert, and Cheryl Yip - for being there. When I think of my thesis
research, I will always think fondly of you.
* MIT Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MCP Class of 2007 - please, I can't laugh anymore.
Thanks for keeping things sane. Planning 2 Plan.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 7
2. BACKGROUND OF URBAN HOUSING PROVISION IN CHINA 10
2.1 Period I: Socialism and the Rise of the Work Unit (1948-1976) 11
2.2 Period II: Full Commoditization of Housing (1978-1998) 12
2.3 Period III: Contemporary Policy (1998-Present) 14
2.4 Consequences of Current Housing System 18
2.5 The "70 Percent, 90 Square Meter" Policy and Mixed-Income Housing 19
2.5.1 Lifecycle of a Policy 19
2.5.2 How mixed-income concept is embedded in "70 percent, 90 square" policy 20
2.5.3 Developer Interest in Mixed-Income Housing: The Vanke Example 21
3 MIXED INCOME HOUSING CONCEPT 25
3.1 Defining Mixed-Income 26
3.2 The Emergence of Mixed-Income Housing in the United States 27
3.3 Why Develop Mixed-Income Housing? Perceived Benefits and Drivers 30
3.4 Different Developments Have Different Motivations to Mix 31
3.5 What Has Mixed-Income Accomplished 35
3.6 Mixed-Income Housing Must be Profitable 37
4 CASE STUDIES 38
4.1 Case Study One: Rollins Square 40
4.1.1 Project Description 40
4.1.2 Summary 50
4.2 Case Study Two: Harbor Point 52
4.2.1 Project Description 52
4.2.2 Summary 61
4.3 Case Study Three: Metropolitan 62
4.3.1 Project Description 61
4.3.2 Summary 71
4.4 Findings from Case Studies - Factors for Success
4.4.1 Follow Basic Rules of Real Estate Development and Management
4.4.2 Moderate-Income Tier Bridges Low- and Market-Rate Tiers
4.4.3 Critical Mass of High-Income Households Needed
4.4.4 Marketing Does Not Emphasize Mixed-Income
4.4.5 Tenants of all income tiers need to perceive fair treatment.
5 CONCLUSION
5.1 Implications for China
REFERENCE
1. INTRODUCTION
After half a century of dramatic economic reform, the Chinese government is struggling to maintain the
fundamental aspects of communist ideologies while embracing a market-oriented national system of
urban housing provision. No longer are decades of communism able to suppress the desire to own one's
home in China. In 1985, before China overhauled the housing structure and let urbanites buy their state-
owned apartments at below-market prices, privately owned homes accounted for less than 17 percent of
the urban housing stock.' Today, China's homeownership rates are as high as 80 percent in some cities.
The rapid sale of millions of apartments held by state-owned enterprises has transferred a huge amount of
wealth into private hands, creating a new class of urban property owners. This growing wealth disparity is
reflected in the spatial segregation of households by income tiers. This stratification hurts old-line party
ideals and threatens a harmonious society.
Shanghai is a city that well-illustrates this conflict. The boom in residential real estate development and
the speculative practices that subsequently emerged have dramatically increased housing prices. Since
most Shanghai residents now own homes, private developers are catering to a market of investors and
those looking to upgrade to luxury accommodations. The unfolding story is a retold one: low- and
moderate-income households are either relocated by construction of luxury developments or simply
priced-out of the urban center.
The high rate of urbanization only contributes to class tensions. 40 percent of the total Chinese population
lives in urban areas. 2 The government has a goal of 55 percent urbanization by 2020. This means an
additional 140 million migrants in the cities. Most of these migrants will be poor and lack skills
transferable to work in high-income city jobs. 3 Furthermore, they will not have the benefit of work-unit
housing as in the past. The central government's expressed concern over housing affordability in cities is
really challenged by their overall policy on urbanization.
The availability of affordable housing and the ability for all income tiers to live in the urban centers is
progressively being framed as an issue of equity that is inherently linked to China's political identity as a
socialist nation. Gone are the old work-units, or danweis, that were historically a mixed-income housing
prototype. Relinquishing the role of housing provision to private developers may have concentrated
poverty, heightened social tensions, and diminished the equality of provided services. As such, the central
government is addressing these problems by experimenting with policy that increases affordability and
decreases spatial segregation in a commercialized housing market.
The goals of current government policies are to create a harmonious society with reduced inequality. As
an issue of equity, the central government is increasingly concerned with decreased affordability due to a
speculative housing market and the increased spatial separation of households based on income levels. In
regards to the former, Premier Wen Jiabao stressed strengthened regulation of housing prices to cool
down the sector when addressing the National People's Congress in March of 2007. He vowed to
"improve fiscal and tax policies to increase support and establish a sound system of low-rent housing," as
well as "improve and standardize the system of affordable housing." At the end of 2006, 512 of 657 cities
in China had initiated affordable housing strategies.4 The Ministry of Construction is requiring all
Chinese cities to fully implement a plan to provide affordable housing by the end of 2007.
Within this strategy to increase the supply of affordable units in urban areas is the mandate commonly
referred to as the "70 percent, 90 square meters" rule. This controversial policy initially required 70
percent of units in all new housing projects to be at most 90 square meters. In theory, a flooding of
smaller units would decrease the entry level price for housing ownership. The government experienced
extreme resistance from the private housing development industry, with enforcement being rather
difficult. Critics cite the rule as being arbitrary and too broadly applied. 90 square meters may be too
small for some cities while too large in others to achieve the desired goals. Developers especially did not
want to mix their product types, with some arguing that they only want to specialize in luxury projects.
Although requiring smaller sized units does not translate directly to units being affordable to low- or
moderate-income households, developers still feared having to build a mixed-income housing project that
may have higher risks. The debate and fear of mixed income housing that was born from this policy still
remain. Fewer and fewer mixed income housing developments exist with the extinction of the work units.
As the situation currently stands, the majority of housing built for low-income households is being
developed by the government on large parcels isolated from higher income neighborhoods. If policy
trends continue, private developers can reasonably foresee and prepare for government mandates
requiring them to build affordable units on-site for future developments. Thus, government policies on
affordability could inevitably mean the production of mixed-income communities.
This thesis is a product of the aforementioned debates surrounding the implementation of the "70 percent,
90 square meters" rule. The purpose is to examine an alternative mixed-income housing concept that
integrates affordable housing units with market rate housing units for the Chinese urban housing market.
Although many exist, the two main goals for mixing incomes are aligned with the objectives of the
Chinese government. They are: 1) to increase affordable housing stock; and 2) to desegregate and
deconcentrate poverty. This thesis focuses on the latter goal.
This thesis begins with an overview of the current housing policy environment in cities and the historical
policies and trends from which it emerged. Debates on the issue of equity will be reviewed to prepare for
a dialogue on mixed-income developments. Next, the experience of conscientiously mixing incomes in
the United States will be presented briefly. Mixed income projects can be differentiated around the scale
of the project, spectrum of the income mix, and the physical resolution in which people are mixed. A
survey of recent findings and best practices are included. Case studies on three Boston, Massachusetts
projects will then be used to illustrate how units affordable to low- and mid-income households have been
successfully incorporated into housing projects rather than as separate and isolated developments.
Through research entailing interviews of academics, developers and other project participants, site visits,
and reviews of project documentation, an in-depth understanding of these innovative and somewhat
extreme cases of income mixing is provided. The unique physical characteristics, objectives, financial
structure, marketing techniques, and property management of each project are investigated. Case studies
conclude with a summary of common preconditions for success and observations relevant to those
contemplating such a development.
Findings from the cases surveyed are not intended to be directly applied to cities in China. Rather, the
presented cases are used to illustrate that mixed income communities can be developed successfully and a
version may be feasible in China.
Finally, the thesis concludes with common factors of successful mixed-income developments,
implications for China, as well as other noteworthy observations related to the mixed-income product
type. This thesis is intended to be a resource for Chinese developers, academics, policy-makers, planners,
and architects either contemplating or already planning communities with low and moderate-income
components.
2. BACKGROUND OF URBAN HOUSIING PROVISION IN CHINA
Chinese housing policy underwent dramatic reforms in the last half century. Having shifted away from
communist ideologies towards a more market-oriented economic approach, China has transformed their
national system of housing provision. In the past, the central government produced, distributed, and
subsidized almost all urban housing with rents set independently of construction or maintenance costs.
Debates over socialist orthodoxy caused the central government to hesitate for many years from
incorporating market mechanisms in their policy-making process. Today, the significant changes the
government made to the institutional structures of land and housing allocation has allowed many Chinese
to own their own' homes and construction to function primarily within the commercial markets. However,
the government continues to struggle with maintaining the fundamental features of a socialist society
while allowing market forces to shape the process of urbanization. This section provides an overview of
urban housing production in China since 1949 and challenges to contemporary housing policies posed by
the historical and political context from which they emerged.
For the purpose of this paper, the history of housing production in China is important to evaluating the
appropriateness of mixed income development scenarios. In countries like the United States, the notion of
mixing incomes as a policy rose from the civil rights movement and efforts at desegregation. China
begins at a very different starting point. Contemporary policies and practice are all products of past
patterns of housing construction, distribution, management, and the rent system. This paper does not
make feasibility recommendations nor does it attempt to imply direct applicability of the surveyed cases.
However, providing the history of urban housing and contemporary issues in China gives a basis to
analyze the preconditions for success presented in the case studies as they relate to the Chinese context.
Housing policy in the last few decades can be considered in three periods. The founding of the People's
Republic of China in 1949 ushered in the first period, which is characterized by the central government's
systemic efforts to control all housing resources and the total elimination of private ownership. Dramatic
housing policy changes began occurring in 1957, when urban housing was recognized as a fundamental
public good provided by a socialist welfare system.5 The rise of the work unit, or danwei, was
instrumental in transitioning the provision of housing to the government.6 From 1978 to 1998, the second
period began with the National Plan for Housing Reform facilitating a market-oriented approach. Private
ownership was encouraged with limited government controls.7 The third period begins in 1998 with the
complete abandonment of the danwei system and the full commercialization of urban housing. This
market-oriented approach has produced an arguably inequitable distribution of land and housing
8resources, posing a direct conflict with China's political identity as a communist country. Based on
experiences in the United States, developing mixed income projects could be a partial response to this
conflict.
2.1 Period I: Socialism and the Rise of the Work Unit (1949-1978)
Before 1949, most Chinese lived in self-provided housing without any government assistance.
Overcrowded and unsanitary conditions were common but housing was not viewed as the responsibility
of the central government.9 When the People's Republic of China was established in 1949, a socialist
system systematically, albeit very slowly, took ownership of all major economic assets, such as housing.'0
Between 1949 and 1956, the municipal governments claimed exclusive ownership over lands in the city
in accordance with the socialist transformation of the means of production. Remaining home owners were
pressured to give up their "surplus" housing to help working-class families under the pressure of the
socialist regime." In the beginning, the Chinese Communist Party had limited administrative capacity and
relied heavily on the private sector. A "controlled market" 2 existed whereas the government set rents but
the majority of urban housing remained under private ownership. By the end of 1956, families owning
private housing decreased to 30 to 35 percent.' 3 Housing conditions actually deteriorated in many cities
during this time because the demand far exceeded the limited housing supply. A major policy response to
these poor housing conditions was the emergence of the work-unit, or danwei, housing. Public housing
included work unit housing and municipal public housing, the former constituted the majority of the
supply. Workers obtained housing through the work-unit housing allocation system based on their social
status and length of employment rather than price and income."
The creation of the work unit allocation system in 1957 marked the beginning of a series of major
housing policy changes. The work-unit was strategic in shifting housing from private to public ownership.
By 1966, the government controlled rent pricing, property tax collection, repairs, maintenance,
management, investment, and allocation of urban housing. 5 Private ownership was made obsolete and
housing shifted from being viewed as a commodity to being a product of the welfare state. By 1977, the
share of privately held housing rapidly declined to a low of 15 percent and almost all investments in urban
housing was made by the state.16 Private ownership was not explicitly banned, but rather eradicated via
high land rent and acquisition controls that made private housing unprofitable and almost impossible to
build.17
As the primary housing allocation system, the work-units set low rents that covered only maintenance
costs and aimed to improve living standards while stimulating worker productivity. Additionally, the
work units slowed down urbanization by allowing only those registered as "urban" residents in the
national registration system to qualify for housing.' 8 Housing was removed from market forces and
insulated from supply- and demand-based production and pricing.
The problem with the work unit system is that the supply of housing was far below demand and the
central government faced large financial burdens given the artificially low rent levels. During this period,
government-owned public housing costs averaged only one percent of workers' average earnings.19
Furthermore, private developers were unable to meet the housing demand and a large degree of inequity
rose from the obstinate and highly politicized allocation system.
2.2 Period II: Full Commoditization of Housing (1978-1998)
After 1978, the government took on a series of economic reforms that allowed the reintroduction of
market forces and private enterprises in the production of housing. Deng Xiaoping began to legitimize the
commoditization of housing and introduced many market economy elements into housing allocation. In
particular, he advocated for the privatization of public housing by increasing rent levels, selling units to
private individuals, encouraging investment from the private and foreign sector, decreasing the
construction of public housing, protecting private homeownership, and again promoting self-built urban
housing.20 These housing reforms started to come in affect in 1984. The country was transformed from
having a goal of a socialist egalitarian system to one with a more unequal income distribution.
During the 1980s, the government continued increasing the role of the market in housing development
and thus decentralized more and more power to local governments and work-units. 2 1 Work units were
then able to purchase public housing at below-market rates and sell it to their employees. In 1985, the first
national survey of housing stock in 323 cities reported that work unit housing comprised 75 percent of the
total housing floor area while housing directly managed by municipalities comprised only 9 percent and
private housing accounted for 16 percent of the total. By 1988, the state contributed only 16 percent
while the work unit financed 52 percent of annual housing investment on average. This is a sharp
decrease of state investments from the 1980 high of 90 percent.
Also during the 1980s, semi-private new construction began to take on a greater role and state-owned
enterprises began to implement planning and development efforts throughout urban areas. The first semi-
private real estate company, China Real Estate Development Company, was founded in 1981. These
companies boomed in the 1990s.24
Explicit privatization objectives in the 1988 National Housing Reform Plan caused a dramatic shift in
housing provision. Commercial housing investment increased almost three times from 1992 to 1993, with
the number of private real estate firms reaching 19,000 in 1993.2 The Plan aimed to decrease government
control and dependence on the state for housing provision. In addition, the Plan called to increase housing
rents, change the allocation system from in-kind to cash subsidy, encourage housing ownership and
convert both existing and new housing stock into market commodities.2 6 The State Council of the
Implementation Plan for a Gradual Housing System Reform in Cities and Towns formed guidelines that
established the sale of public housing. From 1990 to 1993, 14,000 units of public housing sold in Beijing,
producing 1.7 billion yuan for the government. Commercial housing began dominating the market as a
direct result of the sharp rise in real estate companies and the sale of public housing.2 8
During the 1990s real estate boom due to privatization, the rising cost of housing became a significant
concern for many Chinese families. The resilience of the work units was a response to the emphasis on
high-end production and the thus cost escalation. 29 From 1985 to 1998, the average annual household
expenditures increased from 802 yuan to 6,089 yuan, increasing 7.5 times.3 0 Housing expenditures rose
from 32 yuan to 408 yuan, increasing more than 15 times.3 ' This means housing expenditure as a portion
of total household expenditures rose 67.5 percent. These figures only apply to those who did not receive
public housing. Housing inequality is rooted in both historical access as well as contemporary income
differences.
Table 1. Transitional Milestones from Public to Private Housing Provision
1957 Creation of Danwei System with
direct housing distribution from gov
1978 Danwei becomes more autonomous
1988 Private development begins
Danwei's begin buying public
housing and distributing
AiEL II ,
90 2000
1981 1s semi-private development
comoanv founded
1998 End of Danwei System
2.3 Phase III: Contemporary Policy (1998 -Present)
"The development of China's real-estate industry changed Chinese people's way of life and also changed
China's economy," says Gu Yunchang, professor and vice chairman of the China Real Estate Research
Association and an engineer of the housing reform.
Within two decades, China has completely transformed their system of housing finance and production.
Gone are days when households were completely dependent on their work-unit or government housing
provisions. Many Chinese households can now own their own homes. The commercial housing sector is
trying to respond to this new demand. While the overall living standards have increased, the continued
role of the work-units, the failure of the government's new homeownership programs, and the
inefficiencies of commercial mortgage finance system show the disparities between those being served
and those not by current housing policies.
The work-units resiliently served a need in the urban housing system. The work unit was an intermediary
between the public and private sectors and undermined a fully efficient market allocation system. Work
units bought commercial housing at market rates but resold them to employees at lower values. However,
1960 1970
work-units had decreasing capacity to provide their employees with subsidies as the price of housing
increases. This phenomenon did not lead to a more functional market, but rather greater polarization. The
purchasing power of work units had driven down housing prices for all public employees. However, low
ranking work units struggled to provide for their employees while high ranking work units are able to buy
the newly commoditized housing.32
In 1998, the central government moved away from the work-unit housing allocation system and towards
privatizing the housing market by encouraging the sale of secondhand homes and gradually raising rents
for those who do not own. In 1994, the Housing Reform Steering Group of the State Council announced
two programs: the Housing Provident Fund compulsory savings scheme and the subsidized construction
of "affordable housing," or Jingji Shiyong Fang.33 These programs aimed to promote homeownership and
move away from public housing.
In 1998, under the Housing Provident Fund, public sector employees were transitioned from the
workplace allocation system and into the housing market by raising their salaries and requiring mandatory
contribution into a housing fund. The state and work-unit matched employees' savings to bolster
individual purchasing capacity. The fund can be used for a multitude of purposes that relate to
homeownership, such as building, buying, down payment, and mortgage expenses.
By 2003, the total funds in the Housing Provident Fund reached 284 billion yuan. 40 percent was used
to provide favorable home mortgages to urban employees.36 Despite this large amount, the Fund helps
only a small subset of the population. The voluntary nature of this program limits the primary
beneficiaries to government, state-owned enterprise, and other public sector workers. While there are
approximately 200 million employed in urban China, only 70 million works in the public or state-owned
enterprise sector. 37 Of those public sector workers, many are low-level employees whose work-unit is
unable to contribute to the Housing Provident Fund. In addition to serving a small population, connecting
subsidies to income means the program regressively subsidizes higher-income individuals.
Unlike the Housing Provident Fund, the affordable housing program suffers from allowing too many
people to participate. The affordable housing program acts from the supply side and subsidizes
development by providing land, waiving fees, and limiting the profits of developers.38 By 1999, 60
percent of all new housing was built under this program. This program suffers from serving too many
people. Prices of the affordable units are typically 20 percent below market value. 39 The policy intended
to target low- to middle-income first-time buyers. However, the high-income threshold of 60,000 yuan
allowed most upper-middle income households to qualify for this program.40 Although the affordable
housing program cuts the price of housing almost in half, units are still out of reach for most low to
middle-income households. In 1995, housing policy (privatization and subsidies combined) accounted for
37 percent of the overall inequality in urban income distribution in urban China.4 1 Nearly 41 percent of
the housing subsidies were received by the richest 10 percent of the urban population, and just over 60
percent of the rental value of owned housing accrued to the top 10 percent of the population.42
Mortgage financing has also been a significant component of the government's push to privatize housing.
In 1994, bank loans were made available not only to developers, but also to home buyers.43 That year,
Construction Bank issued 198,000 mortgages while Industrial Commercial Bank issued mortgage loans of
390 million yuan.44 Housing credits can assess the risk of mortgage lending, which boomed in the mid
1990s. By 1994, over 4,000 housing credit departments existed throughout China.45 Today, loan terms
can be up to 30 years with loan-to-value ratios at 80 percent.4 6
The following is table of key housing reforms that led to the present state of housing provision in China
Table 2. Key Housing Reform Initiatives, the People's Republic of China, 1979 - present
Year Policy Jurisdiction Results
1979 1st Experiment: Xian, Nanning Terminated due to low
Commercial housing sold at demand and low affordability
building cost
1982- 2nd Experiment: Zhengzhou, Terminated due to high cost
1985 Commercial housing Changzhou, Siping to the public sector and
subsidized by employer and and Shashi limited demand
city government
1986- 3 rd Experiment: Yantai Produced a successful plan
1988 Raise public sector rents; with a comprehensive
introduce housing subsidy for approach, later used as a
public-sector employees; model for other cities
promote sales of public-sector
housing
1988- National Housing Reform Plan National, with local Progress in the sales of
1992 1988: similar to Yantai reform variations, e.g., public-sector housing;
- Raise public sector rents; Shanghai Housing housing situation still linked
issue cash subsidies; sell Reform Plan 1991 to employer; a housing
public-sector housing market was not established
1993- Decision on deepening the National Preparation for the
1997 Urban housing Reform 1993: establishment of a
socialize housing investment, commercial housing market
provision and management
1998- Termination of Welfare National Establishment of a
present Housing Allocation and the commercial housing market;
Monetarisation of Housing
Subsidies
Source: Xu, Yi. "Effects of Housing Policies on Intra-Urban Inequality in Transitioning China." 2005
2.4 Consequence of Current Housing System
The privatization of public housing along with the affordable housing program and a developing
mortgage system has helped China achieve one of the highest homeownership rates in the world.47 With
that being said, the programs mostly help middle- to high-income households. Millions of urban Chinese
residents are challenged by lack of affordable housing. In many ways, privatization has contributed to
increased inequality. Furthermore, increase in health and education due to commercialization in other
aspects of the economy has placed greater burden on the disposable income of many Chinese
households.4 8
Despite the privatization of public housing and increasing rent rates, the government has not raised the
low salaries of many workers who continue to struggle with housing affordability. The salaries of most
urban residents remain low in comparison to the high cost of housing. The government's strict control of
inflation and salaries attributes to and exacerbates this condition. These urban dwellers understandably
end up buying highly subsidized flats instead of market rate units. On the other hand, those with higher
incomes have a wide range of housing choices. A fully functioning housing market exists only for those
with high-incomes.4 9
In March of 2007, Chinese lawmakers passed by a wide margin a landmark property law at the annual
meeting of the National People's Congress.50 This law highlights how private property remains a
contentious issue about equity nearly 30 years after China began dropping central planning in favor of a
free market. The law allows that, while all land still belongs to the state, individual use rights can be
renewed automatically after terms of between 30 and 70 years. It lays out rules for compensation and
delves into technical aspects such as transfer rights and mortgages. The law offers the same protections
for private and public property. This law finally recognizes what has already been true in fact: China is a
land of private property, with some of the highest homeownership rates in the world. The rapid sale of
millions of apartments held by state-owned enterprises has transferred an enormous amount of wealth into
private hands, creating a new class of urban property owners. These new homeowners have been willing
to band together in law courts and tenant organizations to fight for their rights. To an influential group of
retired communist officials and scholars, however, the legislation threatens the state's guiding role and is a
vehicle for unrestrained privatization that feeds a growing income gap between rich and poor.53 Most
notable is that "the law will erase the perception that public interest always supersedes the private", said
Yin Tian, a Peking University professor who helped draft the bill.
Future policies will work to address the continued issues of equity and fairness that is the root of current
debates on private property, affordability, and segregation.
2.5 The "70 Percent, 90 Square Meters" Policy and Mixed-Income Housing
The controversial implementation of the "70 percent, 90 square meters" policy indirectly highlighted the
fear many developers have about mixed-income housing. The following section summarizes the life cycle
of the policy as well as documents some of the reactions towards it. An example of a developer's
response to this policy is documented to provide greater insight into the current housing policy
environment in China, the perception of mixed-income housing within the industry, and the implications
for future housing strategies.
2.5.1 The Life Cycle of a Policy
Almost one year after the central government introduced the "70 percent, 90 square meters" policy, the
National Development and Reform Commission reported that it may take much longer for the full
implementation of the initiative. In May 2006, the Ministry of Construction announced that 70 percent
of all units in new projects should have a gross floor area (GFA) below 90 square meters.55 Residential
developments approved to break ground after June 1, 2006 must adhere to this policy. In the first three
months, only 16 percent of nationwide investments were in residential units with a GFA of less than 90
square meters. 56 The policy was intended to raise the supply of smaller homes and discourage the building
of luxury villas. In theory, the price threshold to own a home should be decreased, especially in urban
centers.
However, this policy immediately stirred controversy and discussions within the housing industry. Many
have claimed the 70 percent rule is too arbitrary and rigid to respond to supply and demand
mechanisms.57 Nie Meisheng, director of the real estate sector of the Federation of Industry and
Commerce and a former senior official in the Ministry of Construction, said it's inappropriate to set a
fixed percentage to reflect market demand. 58 "If the demand exceeds 70 percent, then the price will
continue to rise due to insufficient supply. If the demand is less than 70 percent, a surplus of vacant
property will be created," she said. She believes the 70 percent figure is too high. Furthermore, this policy
falsely implies that size is inherently linked to affordability.
Another concern is the policy is too broad to be appropriate for all cities nationwide. 59 Yin Kunhua, a
former professor at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, said the 90-square-meter standard
might be appropriate for second- and third-tier cities, but could be too small for Shanghai and Beijing.
Beijing appeared the hardest hit by the 70 percent, 90 square meters policy as its government has
demonstrated little flexibility in implementing the policy. Knight Frank, a London-based property
consultancy, reported in April 2007 that Beijing's residential demand is skewed toward large units with
sizes well above 90 square meters. 60 A month prior to the policy taking effect in Beijing, residential units
of more than 90 square meters accounted for 68 percent of the city's total residential transactions. 61
The lack of standardized enforcement mechanisms, communication channels, and clarity in the policy's
language has produced uneven policy impacts. An estimated 600 projects that should have commenced
work in the second half of last year were delayed as the policy has caused confusion among developers.62
The reports said developers may have anticipated a loosening of the policy, and thus did not modify
development plans to comply with the new rule until early this year. Coupled with other policies
including stricter capital requirements for developers, the policy has contributed to a 40 percent decline in
the total GFA of residential projects under construction in the second half of 2006.63 This in turn fueled
expectations of insufficient supply of large residential units in the future, ironically contributing to a
recent surge in residential prices.
Xavier Wong, director of Knight Frank Beijing, adds "Local governments have different interpretations of
the policy due to its ambiguities while demand for small residential units varies greatly in different
regions." Shenzhen has been the least affected city as demand there is broadly in line with the policy. In
2005, units smaller than 80 square meters accounted for 51.9 percent of the housing supply.64 Thus,
developers need not significantly modify project plans to implement the policy. Meanwhile, Knight
Frank's report said municipal governments in Guangzhou and Shanghai have both loosened the policy. In
Guangzhou and Shanghai, the policy was applied to the total development in a particular area rather than
a single project. Furthermore, a developer who submits multiple development plans for approval at the
same time will have the policy applied to all projects as one bundle.
2.5.2 How mixed-income concept is embedded in the "70 percent, 90 square meters" policy
Private housing development industry was resistant to the government "70 percent, 90 square meters"
policy because it could indirectly require them to develop mixed-income communities. Many developers
did not want to mix their product types let alone income levels, with some arguing that they only want to
specialize in luxury projects. Although the size requirement does not necessarily translate to units being
affordable to low- or moderate-income households, developers still feared the potential requirement to
build a mixed-income housing project because they perceived a higher financial risk with these projects.
Fewer and fewer mixed income housing developments exist with the extinction of the work units. As the
situation currently stands, the majority of housing built for low-income households is being done by the
government on large parcels isolated from neighborhoods of higher incomes. If policy trends continue,
private developers can reasonably foresee government mandates requiring them to build affordable units
on-site for all future developments. Thus, the government policies on affordability could inevitably mean
the production of mixed-income communities. The fear of mixed-income housing remains as this policy
may signal the following of similar policies.
This thesis arises from an interest in these aforementioned debates surrounding the implementation of the
"70 percent, 90 square meters" rule. The purpose is to examine an alternative mixed-income housing
concept that integrates affordable housing units with market rate housing units to the Chinese urban
housing market. Although many goals exist, the two main ones for mixing incomes are aligned with the
objectives of the Chinese government. They are: 1) to increase affordable housing stock; and 2) to
desegregate and deconcentrate poverty. This thesis will focus on the latter goal.
2.5.3 Private Developer Interest in Mixed Income Housing: The Vanke China Group Example
This section uses observations of the Vanke China Group as an example of developer reaction to the "70
percent, 90 square meters" policy. The internal thoughts of the management about mixed-income housing
help provide the real-life context in which this concept is dealt with by developers.
The China Vanke Co Limited is the largest, publicly-traded housing developer in China. They specialize
in moderate- and luxury- residential developments. Based on interviews with staff members in Shanghai,
Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, there are four main reasons why mixed-income housing is of interest to them:
1. The Chairman's social commitment to affordable housing - Wang Shi spearheads the changes
that are making Vanke a more mission-driven organization that produces social benefits
2. The "70 percent, 90 square meters" policy suggests similar policies are impending
3. The deed for employee and workforce housing on-site
4. The public relations gained by incorporating affordable units is great, improving Vanke's
reputation with the government and hopefully helping in garner future land bids or public works
The Chairman's social commitment to affordable housing
Chairman Wang Shi is spearheading Vanke's development of affordable housing. This commitment is
trickling down the corporate ladder but the amount of investment by employees invested into this concept
varies. Some branch offices are more committed than others to incorporating affordable housing into their
future projects and exploring the idea of mixed income housing. The commitment to this issue is really
driven from the top. In Shenzhen, Vanke is exploring entrance into the low-income rental market with a
pilot project. The Vice President of Vanke's Shenzhen headquarters has been instrumental in pushing for
affordable housing because he shares in the Chairman's commitment to fulfilling a social mission of the
company. His branch's foray into affordable housing development is much more advanced than his
counterparts, although plans thus far lack critical nuances and do not reflect best practices observed in
other countries like the United States. This is not to say that the Shenzhen office's approach is better but
rather they seem to have spent more time and energy on this issue.
The "70 percent, 90 square meters" policy suggest similar policies are impending
The current policy trend suggests that developers will inevitably be forced to build affordable housing by
the government regardless of whether or not they think they should do it. The "70 percent, 90 square
meters" rule may have unsuccessful in producing the desired affects, but the intention behind the policy is
being noted by Vanke.
In terms of responding to this mandate, the Shanghai office had commissioned studies on how to best
arrange a 90 square meter unit. Some designs undermine the intent of this space limitation to offer what is
perceived as market desires: large homes. For example, having high ceilings enable buyers to build
second floors after purchase. Models were also made to explore the best ways to sell combinable units.
Now this is not to indict the Shanghai office and this was an exploratory study. There were designs that
showed strict adherence to the purpose of the mandate. Rather, these commissioned studies suggest a fear
of mixing incomes amongst developers. From interviews with various members of the Shanghai team,
mixed-income projects are perceived as financially risky and may even damage the overall reputation of
its luxury brand. The Shanghai office is strategically positioning itself to actually expand and produce
more luxury developments since it has recently gained access to prime downtown real estate. Market
research seems to be limited in terms of what is expected of luxury developments. No sensitivity studies
on how sensitive luxury buyers are to proximity of those in other income tiers have been made. Basing
product layout on what had sold previously does not mean that layout is the best or most suitable.
Furthermore, the actual layout and desire for spatial segregation seems to be based on a feeling more so
than actual data.
Although this developer commissioned studies on how to best follow this policy, management really took
on a wait-and-see approach to actual implementation. This rule did not seem to greatly worry the top
managers. Developers have in their institutional memory other policies that the government had issued
but have not enforced. Many developers were counting on this policy to be no different.
Need for employee housing
Research done by the Shanghai office shows that one service worker is needed for every two households
in their City Garden development. The Shanghai office already has some subsidized housing for
administrative and management level employees. But there is a recognized need for what is called
"servant housing." Those in these positions are either local residents, migrant workers who are not
Shanghai residents, or temporary migrants working in industrial areas or farms. Based on their financial
models, a developer can probably house this group without a problem if there is at least a 7 percent
revenue stream from rents. Vanke representatives from Shanghai recognized that there is a definite need
from this population seeing their horrible living conditions (average 4.55 meters squared of living space
per person) and the efficiencies lost when workers live far away. Furthermore, based on a study done by
an MIT Urban Studies Planning Studio in 2006, residents seem amenable to living with low-income
individuals nearby when they are service workers. Some preliminary sketches show "plugs" or additions
directly to the roofs or sides of existing buildings with affordable units. With all this said, the
representatives went on to say that this housing will not be voluntarily provided if not required by the
government. Although there is encouragement to build affordable housing from the Chairman, the
commitment to this mission varied. Understandably, a representative said, "7 to 8 percent in revenues
does not compare to what we can make. If there is no policy, we will not do it."
The Shenzhen leadership is committed to affordable housing based on the effort they put in their pilot
project. However, there is no consensus on the concept of mixing incomes. Although located within a
larger luxury and moderate-income community, 310 units of affordable rentals are isolated onto one huge
lot. The dormitory style prototype is extremely dense with low-income individuals. The property
management structure is a complicated cooperative model that relies heavily on the self-management of
its tenants. There is concern that mixing incomes will present marketing issues as well as potentially hurt
the Vanke image of providing quality, luxury homes. However, there should also be fear that the failure
of this complicated self-management structure could hurt the project's long run sustainability and create a
slum environment. Interest exists on the viability of mixing incomes as a more sustainable model.
Incorporating affordable units can improve reputation with the government
Incorporating affordable units and thus creating mixed income communities is seen as one way to
improve the company's image to the government. Reputation is very important given that the land
allocation process is a rather secretive, partially-open bid process. Needless to say, showing a
commitment to providing social benefits could benefit a developer in future bids for land from the
government.
3. MIXED INCOME HOUSING CONCEPT
The movement towards mixed-income, multifamily housing in the United States is based on the widely
held belief that this arrangement is preferable to housing that concentrates a large number of low-income
residents together. The 2002 report of the Millennial Housing Commission emphasized that "mixed-
income housing is generally preferable to affordable housing that concentrates and isolates poor families."
This concept and strategy should be of interest to developers and government agencies in China, with
recent publicly-funded affordable housing projects in Shanghai concentrating large numbers of low-
income households on large plots of land at the outskirts of the city. Former HUD Secretary Henry
Cisneros warned in 1993, "We risk a societal collapse by the first decade of the next century if we tolerate
racism and the economic isolation of millions of people." The social and physical isolation of low-income
households are believed to be a barrier to breaking the cycle of poverty. Thus, integration has been
adopted as a housing approach in the United States and may prove to be as important to Shanghai
officials as just providing affordable housing.
Limited research is now emerging to either corroborate or dispel the perceived benefits of mixed income
housing. Nascent but growing literature on the success factors of these developments also exist. This is an
important development seeing to a great extent, mixed-income housing had become a preferred means of
developing affordable housing without much rigorous debate about what was actually to be accomplished.
A 1974 in-depth study that measured success by higher levels of satisfaction among tenants in mixed-
income developments found that income mixing works. The increased satisfaction was primarily linked to
the quality of the development, specifically its "superior design, construction, and management."s Since
then however, the rationale of proponents still often consist of vague references to better social situations
in mixed-income developments or simply, assertions that all low-income public housing were
unsuccessful. Preference for mixed-income housing seems to be both a reaction to past failed housing
efforts as well as the merits of this approach.66 The objectives of mixing incomes range depending on who
you ask and where you ask it at. This becomes an issue when evaluating success. Thus, a review of
literature was done to reveal preliminary findings and insights that clarify objectives as well as what have
been accomplished so far through a mixed income approach.
In the United States, much of the private housing development industry views mixed-income housing as
having higher risks than both traditional market-rate housing or totally subsidized projects. There is
concern that mixed-income housing is too complicated to manage given the differing income
communities, their needs, and the potential for conflict. In addition, financing can be an intimidating,
intricate arrangement of multiple sources. Hence the number of planned, mixed-income developments in
the United States is still quite limited. However, in certain cities such as Boston, San Francisco, and New
York, the public and private generation of affordable housing via mixed income developments has
flourished. The conditions for the success of these developments will be explored.
This section is for developers, government officials, or any others involved in the production of housing
in Chinese cities. Understanding why mixed income housing was adopted as an approach and what
successful projects have accomplished in terms of affordable housing could prove useful in considering
future housing provisions in Shanghai.
3.1 Defining Mixed-Income
The meaning of the term "mixed-income housing" and whether the purpose of mixing is to integrate a
development or a neighbourhood economically is important. Mixed-income housing is not a new idea. In
the United States, many urban neighbourhoods have residents of various incomes and towns that were
planned for a mix of incomes, like Columbia, Maryland and Reston, Virginia. Furthermore, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts created a housing finance agency in 1966 that instated a variety of
funding programs that promote mixed-income housing.
"Mixed-income housing" is a term without a formal definition in the housing field. Like any other
housing development, mixed income developments vary greatly by the same factors. For example: tenant
demographics, location, tenure type, management, and scale. The term also varies by housing market.
Some categorize mixed-income housing based on whether it is mixed at the project level or the
neighbourhood level and whether the owners are public, private, or a combination of the two.67 This thesis
uses Brophy and Smith's definition of mixed-income housing: "a deliberate effort to construct and/or own
a multifamily development that has the mixing of income groups as a fundamental part of its financial and
operating plans.",6 The actual ratio of income levels and the developer's reasons for creating a mixed-
income development vary. Generally speaking however, the market as well the availability of financing
and public subsidies determines what mix of incomes is possible. The differing funding programs each
have different goals that may shape the income mix.
Mixed-income developments can vary in scale, spectrum, and the resolution to which people are
physically next to each other. This thesis will focus on the income spectrum of mixed-income
developments. The wide range of mixed-income developments can be separated by how close or far they
are to market-rate property prices. The scale of incomes can be divided into the following five categories
of mixed-income properties:69
- Moderate-Income Inclusion: Predominately market-rate developments that include units for
moderate-income households
- Low-Income Inclusion: Predominantly market-rate developments that include units for low-
income households
- Broad Range of Incomes: Serves market-rate, moderate-income, or low-income households, and
extremely low-income households
- Market-Rate Inclusion: Predominantly low-income development that include market-rate units
- Affordable Mix: serves moderate- or low-income and extremely low-income households
3.2 The Emergence of Mixed-Income Housing in the United States
The popularity of mixing incomes as a policy approach has gone up and down through the years. During
the 1940s and 1950s, public housing primarily served upwardly mobile, working families. When these
families saved enough to move out to the suburbs, public housing gradually changed from housing for the
deserving to housing for the most needy, or "housing of last resort."70 A series of policies also contributed
to the eventual concentration of the extremely poor, minority households in public housing. In 1961, the
Brooke Amendment eliminated a minimum rent and stipulated that tenants pay no more than 25 percent
of their income for rent. In 1981, a law limited Section 8 and public-housing tenancy almost exclusively
to households with incomes below 50 percent of area median income. Soon afterwards, these projects
became physically dilapidated and distressed with crime.
While the exact date of when communities began making a conscious effort to promote mixed-income
housing is unclear, evidence ofplanning economically integrated communities dates back to the 1960s
when Federal, state, and local governments began assisting in the development. A mixed-income
approach was adopted as a substantial body of research emerged documenting the negative impacts of
concentrating poverty. In 1989, a National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing found that
a major contributing factor to the failure of public housing was the concentration of poverty. Mixed-
income seemed a logical remedy.
The prevailing ethic in US culture as well as in other advanced democracies now is that segregation is
undesirable and should be avoided. This rises from a sensitive history of slavery and institutional racism.
The civil rights movement transformed US policies on segregation and so have lessons learned from
failed, segregated public housing projects in urban areas like Chicago that stigmatized their tenants.
Households living in neighbourhoods with concentrations of very low and low-income residents face
serious social and economic challenges and are usually unable to improve their socio-economic status.
Some of the problems associated with the concentration of poverty include high crime rates, increased
health problems, malnutrition, high unemployment rates, and high numbers of children dropping out of
school. A widespread belief of scholars and housing professionals is that the isolation of low-income
persons from social networks creates a barrier to building strong, stable communities. In theory, a mixed
income development provides low-income resident opportunities to interact with higher-income residents
and thus, be exposed to employment opportunities and social role models.7 2 Current research has placed
serious doubts on this theory but this is one of the rationales behind the initial adoption of mixed-income
method. The implementation of a mixed income approach is a reaction to the failures of past policy as
much as it is on its own merits. In addition mixing incomes became not only a way to build affordable
housing, but to also garner the perceived social benefits of upward mobility from integration.
Mixing incomes has become key to the US Department's Housing and Urban Development's (HUD)
public-housing strategy and gained the support of state and local government as well as nonprofits and
mission-based private developers alike. To date, over $5 billion has been awarded to nearly 150 housing
authorities nationally to address severely distressed public housing through the HOPE VI program. The
following is a short list of notable federal policies that encouraged mixed-income housing.
Federal Programs
o Low Income Housing Tax Credit (1986): LIHTCs allow investors a dollar-for-dollar
reduction of their federal taxes received when they invest in low-income housing
projects. This greatly increased the available equity for affordable housing projects.
LIHTCs promote mixing incomes because developers are allowed to commit as a few as
20 to 40 percent of their units for low-income tenants. LIHTC is estimated to be
responsible for up to 94 percent of the affordable rental production in the US. 73 However,
only 18 percent of LIHTC properties include market-rate units because subsidy allocation
is based on the number of affordable units
o Mixed-Income New Communities (1990): Between 25 to 50 percent of units in public-
housing development are permitted by HUD to be leased families with incomes up to 80
percent AMI. Housing authorities could also lease up to 25 percent of units in a privately
owned property for public-housing tenants
o HOPE VI Revitalization Grants (1992): HUD allocated $4.55 billion from 1993 to 2002
to demolish 78,000 units of public housing and transform them into mixed-income
housing developments. Federal preferences for admitting very-low-income households
was eliminated and public-housing development funds and operating subsidies was
authorized for privately-owned projects
o Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (1998): The act requires public-housing
authorities to attract higher-income tenants into lower-income projects and lower-income
tenants into higher income projects. 40 percent of new admits to public housing must
have incomes below 30 percent AMI while the remaining units are leased to households
making no more than 80 percent AMI.
In addition to federal policies, some states like Massachusetts have elected to give preference to mixed-
income developments when allocating their share of LIHTC. A majority of affordable housing projects in
Massachusetts include market rate units. In addition, local governments also encourage mixed-income
housing through inclusionary zoning laws that require a certain percentage of affordable units in market-
rate developments or offer incentives like density bonuses to encourage the inclusion of affordable units.
Note: China and the US have different starting points
Saying that China begins at a different starting point in terms of housing provision is an understatement.
China's political heads are organized around communist ideals and not until the early 1990s did housing
start to be provided by the private market. Up until this point, housing for the whole urban population was
provided by either the government or the danwei system. Although living standards did vary and there are
reports of inequities, China's system of housing allocation is relatively egalitarian compared to the United
States. Faced with scarce resources, opening this production to the market was an attempt to increase the
stock of housing. The current problem is that the market is only addressing the needs of the new moneyed
class and there has been increased uproar about the lack of affordable housing to those who are of
moderate or low means. Although inequities definitely exist, China does not share the same history of
segregation or the transformative effects of the Civil Rights Movement. The United States adopted the
mixed-income approach not only to produce affordable housing, but also as a reaction to past segregation
and to gain the perceived social benefits from integration. In cities like Shanghai, more and more low-
income individuals are being pushed to the outskirts but the negative connotation of segregation is not
developed. Acknowledging the different starting points is important to those considering the mixed-
income approach in cities like Shanghai. As the following sections will show, motivations and objectives
need to be carefully examined to determine how to implement this approach as well as how to judge its
success.
3.3 Why Develop Mixed-Income Housing? Perceived Benefits and Drivers of Policy
Mixed-income housing has become a preferred means of developing affordable housing in many parts of
the United States.74 Past housing programs, social conditions, and policy changes all came together to
signal a need to address the lack of affordable housing. According to Alastair Smith, the concept of mixed
income housing comes from three factors:75
1. Adverse effects of concentrations of poverty
a. In Theory: Mixing incomes can reduce social ills by managing negative behaviours while
providing opportunities to low-income households through social interactions and better
infrastructure
2. Poor perceived quality of subsidized housing, and
a. In Theory: The inclusion of market-rate units forces the build and maintenance of
development to be high
3. Shortage of affordable housing
a. In Theory: Including market-rate units potentially reduces subsidies needed for affordable
units while overcoming community protest against low-income housing
Mixed income housing has a perceived impact in addressing the underlying problems these factors
represent. Understandably, how the public and the public sector defines and measures success of a mixed
income development in the United States is not as important as the bottom line a for-profit developer.
The first factor is worth elaborating because it deals with the difficulty of measuring social benefits.
Specifically, the rationale is to deconcentrate poverty and revitalize neighborhoods. The following are the
four prominent arguments for how mixed-income developments approach this first factor: 76
- social networks - through social interaction with neighbors of higher incomes and different
backgrounds, low-income people are in networks that provide access to resources, information,
and employment.
- behavioral: the presence of higher-income residents will lead to the influence of role modeling
and the observation of alternate lifestyles and norms, which will in turn promote individual
behavioral change and an increased sense of self-efficacy among lower-income residents
- social control - the presence of higher-income residents will lead to higher levels of
accountability to norms and rules through increased informal social control and thus increased
order and safety for all residents
- political economy - influence of higher-income residents will generate new market demand and
political pressure to which external political and economic actors are more likely to respond,
leading to higher quality goods and services available to all residents.
Past research has challenged these goals the most and will be detailed in following sections.
Mixed income housing is not only the current direction of US housing policy, but it also appeals to
private developers and investors. It intends to relieve the economic burden of housing very low income
households in developments and to remedy the social ills of concentrated poverty. Often, mixed-income
housing requires the effective partnership of public and private entities. From a social standpoint,
numerous studies conclude that "concentrating poor people in poor neighbourhoods perpetuates social
and economic problems, and that moving to a more diverse environment encourages and enables families
to improve their employment, earnings, and educational achievement."77 From an economic standpoint,
"adding market-rate rents to various other public and private resources targeted at low-income units helps
secure the financial feasibility and long-term viability of this type of residential development, thereby
opening the doors for sufficient incentives and profits for developers."78 The renewed interest in building
mixed-income housing stems from the need to use increasingly scare public dollars to leverage private
funds to create and preserve affordable housing. What the objectives of mixed income development are
really varies from project to project but the following are some useful observations.
3.4 Different Developments Have Different Motivations to Mix
The primary motivation for mixing incomes differs depending on the type of development being built.
Clear objectives are paramount to assessing whether or not a mixed-income development is successful.
These goals are shaped largely by the market in which the project is in. For example, if it was never a
realistic goal for a development in a low-income neighborhood to have its market rate units cross-
subsidize the low-income units, and then not achieving this goal should not be considered a failure of the
project. Table 3 shows the primary motivations and the types of markets most commonly associated with
each category of mix. Tight markets have low vacancy rates, but their rents are relatively lower than high-
cost markets like Boston, New York, or San Francisco.
Table 3. Income Mixes, Motivations, and Markets
High-Priority Motivation
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Source: Alastair Smith. "Mixed-income Housing Developments: Promise and Reality." 2002
The following are descriptions of the five general income categories identified by Alastair Smith. Sources
and locations are generalizations and do not represent all developments that fit within a category. These
motivations are based on developer feedback and descriptions of various developments. Motivations
should not be construed with actual outcomes or suggest that these are the only objectives that should be
sought. Emerging literature is beginning to corroborate with each other in support of the achievement of
some of these objectives but there is not a conclusive consensus on their findings. However, this provides
those in China some sense of what developers in some of the most developed and sophisticated affordable
housing markets are doing and expecting. What may be useful is to note what developers are not doing in
certain markets.
Moderate-Income Inclusion
Mix: Approximately 10 to 20 percent of the units are set at below-market rate prices and are affordable to
households at the higher end of the affordable-housing spectrum. For example, 80 percent of the area
median income (AMI). Home ownership is often a possibility since there is a high threshold for the
affordable units.
Market: Typically high-cost housing markets.
Primary Motivations: The main motivation for facilitating an "upper-income-mix" development is the
ability to use fewer subsidies to construct these units. The families served usually have more housing
options and are not limited to neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty. The affordable units in
this range are often referred to as "workforce housing," meaning those that are affordable to teachers,
police officers, or other public service workers who may not otherwise be able to buy or rent in the
neighborhood they work in. The community in which the development is built may object less to living
close to this population.
Funding: These developments are usually privately financed. Incentives like density bonuses or the
relaxing of other zoning restrictions encourage developers and to offset potential losses from the
affordable units.
Low-Income Inclusion
Mix: Most units are market rate but the affordable units reach down to a lower-income population, such
as those households earning 30 or 50 percent of AMI. Because of the lower-income this population, few if
any units are for home-ownership.
Market: Typically high-cost or relatively tight housing markets
Primary Motivation: A primary motivation is the potential to build low-income units with fewer
subsidies. Other strong motivations include the likelihood of increasing the quality of the affordable units
to that of the market rate units, and the ability to attract higher-income families to the neighborhood with
low-poverty. Communities may be more willing to accept these low-income units when they are placed as
a minimal portion of the overall programming.
Funding: Massachusetts and New York City created 80/20 programs that offer tax-exempt or taxable
financing for projects with 20 percent of units reserved for households earning 50 percent AMI or less.
Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) may also be used.
Broad Range of Incomes
Mix: The number of market-rate and affordable units are balanced, with the affordable units targeting
households with 50 to 60 percent AMI. Home-ownership options may be used to attract higher-income
families
Market: Generally strong housing markets to attract market buyers or transitional neighborhoods with
potential to attract market buyers. Subsidies may be needed to attract higher-income tenants to the market
units.
Primary Motivation: Revitalizing a transitional area by attracting higher-income families is a strong
motivation. The stability of the neighborhood may be enhanced since families have the option of moving
up or down within the development. Serving a broader range of households can not only be a motivating
factor, but may make filling the whole development easier.
Funding: LIHTC, HOME and/or HOPE VI
Market Inclusion
Mix: The units are predominantly for low-income residents, with a minority reserved for households that
can afford market rates. Home ownership may be included.
Market: Generally in a transitional neighborhood
Primary Motivation: A strong motivation is to encourage the interaction of lower-income tenants with
higher-income tenants. These developments may be the first step to attracting more higher-income tenants
to the neighborhood. Additionally, the higher-income tenants may increase the overall standard for
building and maintaining the project.
Funding: May include HOPE VI, LIHTC, Section 8 and/or HOME. Subsidies may be needed to attract
market-rate households.
Affordable Mix
Mix: There are no market-rate units. The tenants range from being extremely low to low income
households (30 to 80 percent AMI).
Market: Usually weak markets that cannot attract tenants with incomes closer to AMI
Primary Motivation: The strongest motivation may be the potential for positive interaction amongst
tenants of different income levels. The hope is that the higher-income tenants will act as "role-models" to
the lower-income tenants and foster better work ethics while discouraging negative behavior.
Funding: May include LIHTC, Section 9, HOME, HOPEVI, and or tax-exempt 501(c)3 bonds. Cross-
subsidization is not possible because all units are low-income
3.5 What has Mixed-Income Housing Accomplished?
As the previous section mentioned, the success of mixed-income developments in meeting their key
objectives vary from location to location. Much remains unknown about mixed-income housing. Most
studies have been anecdotal thus far and no studies been bold enough to present conclusive findings. This
section uses prior research as well as a review by Alastair Smith to provide insight into the effectiveness
of this approach in achieving said goals. Each of the goals articulated in response to the aforementioned
drivers are individually assessed below.
Drivers and Success
1. Alleviating Concentrations of Poverty
a. More evidence is showing that isolated mixed-income communities alone cannot help
low-income households break the cycle of poverty as well as living in a healthy, mixed-
income community.
b. Little evidence that tenants in mixed-income developments interact in a meaningful way.
Thus, the theories about role-modeling to alter negative behaviors as well as social
networks to aid finding a job or increase social-mobility really are not accomplished.
c. Strict tenant screening and property management practices have curtailed to incidence of
negative social behavior regardless of the mixture of housing. This finding further
discounts the value in role-modeling, which rather unquestionable assumes that higher-
income tenants have better values and work ethic.
2. Producing High-Quality Developments
a. The most reliable force in guaranteeing high standards are market pressures. It is
important to note that good conditions is not an exclusive characteristic of mixed-income
housing; community pressure is most often effective in maintaining good conditions in
fully subsidized housing
3. Meeting the Shortage of Affordable Units
a. Generally, mixed-income developments have not shown to lessen the amount of subsidy
needed. Cross-subsidization is possible in a few very tight housing markets and often for
developers with low return thresholds. However, there are private developers who are
able to make a profit and continue to build affordable housing. In weak markets and
transitional neighborhoods, higher-income households are often attracted only when
additional investments are made
b. Compared to fully subsidized housing, the mixed-income approach is more palatable to
community members is more effective in overcoming political pushback.
There lacks conclusive or strong support of the first and second arguments but emerging empirical
evidence shows that higher-income residents of mixed-income developments maintain order in the
development and attract external resources to the community (Joseph, Chaskin, Webber, 2005). I would
posit that these arguments help maintain or increase the value of a property, thus increasing the profit
margin.
Mixed income housing was presented as a way to deconcentrate poverty and to decrease segregation. The
focus of this thesis is only on that goal rather than the provision of affordable housing. Based on the
aforementioned findings in the US, the social benefits from desegregation do not seem to be met.
However, I would argue that those in the housing industry in China should not overlook mixed-income
housing as an approach. Too much stratification can inherently hurt the integrity of old party lines that
promote a harmonious society. Mixing incomes and desegregating in China may not be seeking the same
social benefits that this approach is intended to achieve in the United States. In other words, the purpose
of deconcentrating poverty and decrease segregation may be different between the US and China.
3.6 Mixed Income Housing Must Be Profitable
Generally speaking, success for a private for-profit developer is driven by the bottom line - profit. If the
market is left to dictate the supply of housing, Chinese developers would continue producing luxury
condominiums since that housing type gives them the largest profit margin. What makes a property
desirable is directly linked to its asking price: the more desirable a dwelling unit, the higher the demand
for it, the higher of a price it commands on the market, and thus the higher the profits made. If success is
directly linked to profits, which is directly linked to desirability, then the transitive property would link
desirability to success. A property's location, the amenities provided, the available infrastructure, the
quality of management and upkeep are all factors that influence the desirability of a location. The
reputation of the developer and management company are also important in the overall marketing of a
project. Given this definition, any mixed income housing development must remain profitable to qualify
as being successful. Following this stream of thought, a mixed income development must then be
desirable. How much of a profit is needed is individually defined.
4. CASE STUDIES
The following case studies show that mixed-income developments can successfully be built and
maintained. The cases are not meant to offer best practices. Rather, key conditions that made these cases
successful will be extrapolated. Selection of the cases was based on a number of factors, but primarily
because they demonstrate how an extreme form of mixed income housing can be successfully built and
maintained. They are extreme in both the range of incomes served and the resolution to which the
households are mixed (the proximity of different income tiers to one another in the unit layout). The
definition of success and the goals of mixed income housing are individually defined. These cases also
represent some form of innovation, whether it is in development, finance, or management as well as an
extreme form of mixing. They provide enough variance in income mix, layout, demographics, and
ownership structure to provide those in China some more characteristics to look at when contemplating
mixed-income developments. The diversity within these cases allows for a broader view of the trend and
incorporates as many perspectives as possible within a limited sample pool.
Rollins Square, a 184-unit condo and rental community in Boston's South End neighbourhood that
creates and fully integrates a large number of affordable units, particularly those reserved for moderate,
"workforce" households
Harbor Point, a 1,283-unit rental development on the site of a former troubled public housing project,
Columbia Point, in Boston, Massachusetts
The Metropolitan, is a 251-unit development in the downtown Chinatown neighbourhood that mixes 81
very low and low-income households with luxury condominiums within one high-rise building.
For each case, site visits were made to the project and interviews were conducted with key project
participants including the developer and property management team members. The cases were chosen
from Boston, MA because it is a tight, high-demand, high-cost city with a very sophisticated system of
affordable housing and mixed income housing provision. These developments provide a basis for
describing the dimensions of success. The interview methodology for each case study varied slightly
depending upon the nature of the project and the participants interviewed. However, the basic objective
of the interview process was to gather as much information as possible on numerous project details
including background/history, planning process, mix of incomes, financing, ownership structure,
operations, and project design, among others. In addition to site visits and interviews, the case study
process included a thorough review of project documentation including financial prospectuses, marketing
materials, service and program agreements, and project plans.
In seeking to determine common conditions for success, the following outline was used to direct the
scope of the research:
1 Project Background
2 Financial Structure
3 Project Design & Physical Attributes
4 Marketing
6 Management and Operations
7 Summary
Income Mix, Vision, Objective, Project Team,
Location, History, Development Approach
Early Financing, Permanent Financing,
Sources and Uses
Location, Design Approach, Layout of Units,
Resolution of Mixture
Strategy, Challenges, Sales Results
Entity Type, Board Structure /Governance,
Development Management, Property
Management
Critical Success Factors, Challenges,
Constraints, Unique Factors
4.1 CASE STUDY ONE: ROLLINS SQUARE
4.1.1 Project Background
Income Mix: Rollins Square
Income Mix 30-60% AMI 80-120% AMI >100%
Percent 20% 40% 40%
Units 37 rental 73 condo 74 condo
Number of Units: 184, with 6,000 square feet of retail
Placed in Service: 2003
Market: Tight
Primary Goals: Workforce housing
Innovations: Full integration of affordable units; financing
Vision
Rollins Square was envisioned by its
mission-driven developer as creating
an inclusive urban mixed-income
community that contained both for-
sale condominiums and rental
apartments that served as many
"workforce" households as possible.
Innovative financing, high resolution
of mixture, and the spectrum of
income uniquely characterizes this
development in the South End
neighborhood of Boston,
Massachusetts. Rollins Square successfully provided workforce housing in a rapidly gentrifying urban
neighborhood. This 184-unit mixed-income community contains 147 condominium units, 37 rental
apartments, 6,000 square feet (560 square meters) of ground-floor retail space. The 73 affordable
condominium units are targeted to South End residents who provide critical services to the community.
Workforce housing is affordable to middle-income workers such as teachers, nurses, and firefighters who
do not qualify for most housing subsidy programs but also do not have the income necessary to purchase
housing in many high-priced cities where they work. In terms of unit mix, there are 20 percent low-
income, 40 percent moderate income (workforce), and 40 percent market rate units. The rental units are
reserved for low-income families on the Boston Housing Authority's high priority waiting list for
housing. Most of the units are for-sale condos, with particular focus on moderate-income units for first
time homebuyers. The Rollins Square project was developed on land formerly owned by the City of
Boston by the Planning Office for Urban Affairs (POUA), Inc., a 508(c)(3) nonprofit housing developer
affiliated with the Archdiocese of Boston.
Objective
Rollins Square really focused on providing moderate-income units for first-time homebuyers because
there was an unanswered need to serve the growing workforce in this neighborhood. There were plenty of
luxury units and a proportionately fair amount of low-income units available. Preference was given to
current South End residents as well as those who work in the area who provide critical services to the
community. The idea is that people should be able to live where they work. The percentage of moderate-
income units was originally slated to be higher at 50% but due to financial constraints, had to be scaled
down.
An emphasis was placed on building high-quality units for all the residents. The mission-driven developer
really emphasized creating a place that is treats its tenants fairly and with respect. This emphasis on
equality was the rationale for including subsidized units on the most profitable locations like the
penthouse or ground floor.
Project Team
Rollins Square exemplifies what partnerships between nonprofits and the private sector can achieve when
creative and dedicated people work together to solve specific problems," said Lisa Alberghini, Executive
Director, Planning Office for Urban Affairs.
Owner/Developer: Planning Office for Urban Affairs
* Boston, Massachusetts
e Established in 1969
* Developed approximately 1,690 units of affordable mix-ed income
housing with additional 650 under development
* 508(c)(3) nonprofit housing developer affiliated with the Archdiocese of
Boston
Development
Consultant: Peter J. Roche
e Real Estate and Community Development
e Winthrop, Massachusetts
General Contractor:
Architect:
Marketing/Sales
Property Manager
Suffolk Construction
e Boston, Massachusetts
- www.suffolk-construction.com
Childs Bertram and Tseckares
e Boston, Massachusetts
e www.cbtarchitects.com
Peabody Properties, Inc.
e Quincy, Massachusetts
e www.peabody.properties.com
Maloney Properties, Inc.
e Wellesley, Massachusetts
e www.maloneyproperties.com
Location and History
Rollins Square is a diverse and vibrant urban neighborhood adjacent to Beacon Hill and Back Bay, two of
the most expensive neighborhoods in Boston. The South End is characterized by a blend of low-income
housing, newly constructed high-priced condominiums, and commercial office space that primarily serves
educational and health care institutions. The neighborhood itself is made of a wide mix of incomes. This
is a highly desirable neighborhood to live in given the proximity to public infrastructure and abundance of
retail. The South End itself could be a case study in diverse mixed-income neighborhoods. This unique
aspect of the location is important because rather than receiving pushback from the community on the
development of affordable units, the community actually welcomed the mixed income development.
Rollins Square was awarded to POUA by the Boston Redevelopment Agency (BRA) in the mid-i 970s.
The site 1.9 acre site was initially slated for the expansion of an adjacent Catholic high school but was
changed to answer the emerging demand for affordable and moderate-income housing.
The BRA retained a fee ownership interest until construction to encourage accelerated development on
this site.
Development Approach
The South end is a rapidly gentrifying
neighborhood and the need to serve the
moderate-income households had
remained largely unanswered. The diverse
nature of the neighborhood was a great
asset. The community, as well as the city,
was not only amenable to building this
project, but gave active encouragement
through the process. Public support is
especially critical in Boston, a city with a
complicated and strict permitting process.
The city of Boston assembled a group of community leaders to form the Washington Gateway Main
Streets Association to create an overall vision for the site. The developer shared in this vision and was
fast-tracked through the approvals process.
Innovations in Financial Structure
POUA had a total of 14 financing sources that were made up of debt, equity, and grants. Rollins Square
was made more complex by the fact that the developer wanted both condominium and rentals on one site.
This was an ambitious development program that required a sophisticated and professional financing
team. Key members include the city of Boston, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Fleet Bank, and the
AFL-CIO. This unusual public-private partnership focused on finding innovative and flexible financing
approaches.
A number of challenges emerged because the proposed project included both for-sale and rental units.
First, funds had to be applied for twice - once for each component. The issue of collateral had to be
addressed along with the difficult structuring of the legal entities to cover all parties concerned. The
predevelopment period was increased by the application process.
The BRA was instrumental in the site assembly by only valuing the land based on the 74 units of market-
rate housing. The affordable units were not included in the land valuation and thus, the total price land
value was $1.5 million. Additionally, the BRA deferred repayment until construction completion.
Rollins Square also benefited from Boston's "linkage ordinance," which requires developers of major
nonresidential projects to either pay a specified impact fee or develop an equivalent value of on-site
housing affordable to those at or below 80 percent of Boston's area median income (AMI). The linkage
program provided a predictable, long-term funding stream for the development of low- to moderate-
income housing in urban centers.
Several scarce financing resources for developers of low- and moderate-income for-sale housing in
Boston was secured by POUA. The following funds financed only the portion of the development costs
for the moderate-income condominiums.
Development Cost
Site Acquisition $ 1,150,000
Construction $53,000,000
Soft $11,151,000
Total $65,651,000
Public Funds for Moderate-income Condominiums
Type Name Amount
State HOME Funds $1.17 mil
State Affordable Housing Trust Funds $2.00 mil
State MassHousing permanent financing $2.90 mil
City Leading the Way Funds (mayor's discretionary affordable housing fund) $1.17 mil
City Boston Neighborhood Housing Trust (housing linkage program) $2.50 mil
Total $9.74 mil
In addition to these public funds is the capability and willingness of the developer to internally cross-
subsidize the moderate-income condominium units with 11 million of forgone development fees. The
developer is a non-profit, mission-driven organization with the important objective of having affordable
housing.
FleetBoston was the lead lender of the $52 million construction loan and provided tax credit equity of
more than $3.8 million. Given this very unique arrangement with a private sector commercial bank, there
were unusual underwriting challenges for the construction loan that fostered a creative treatment of
collateral.
In the construction phase, the lender FleetBoston required the developer to put a sales hold on a
percentage of the project's moderate-income condominium units. These "escrowed" units offered extra
security that compensated for the limited guarantee the developer was capable of providing. The
developer released moderate-income condominiums on a gradual schedule spread over time. If the
market-rate units did not meet pro forma projections, some moderate-income units would be sold at
market rate. The developer actually set out to have around 50% moderate-income condominiums and
came down to the current mix of 40%.
Project Design and Physical Attributes
Rollins Square is a unique, extreme case of mixing in that affordable rental units were spread throughout
the project rather than concentrated in one building or a single floor. There are even affordable units on
the penthouse floor. This component was central in the developer's mission to desegregate poverty in the
name of fairness and equality. The overall construction quality is maintained at a high degree and
exteriors of all units are indistinguishable. Only when the doors of the units are opened will an observer
notice any difference: market rate units are equipped with hardwood floors and upgraded appliances.
POUA wanted to crate family-friendly environment that integrates well within the existing neighborhood.
Creating opportunities for interaction was one design objective. Long double-loaded corridors were
eliminated, small buildings were constructed, and few units exist on each floor in hopes of creating a
greater sense of community and encouraging interaction amongst neighbors. Careful attention to details,
like place a mirror in front of the elevator shafts, encourages tenants to linger and mingle with one
another on a daily basis.
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Marketing
Marketing emphasis was really placed on the prime location of this site in the heart of Boston and is one
of the most desirable neighborhoods to live in. The careful attention to detail and high quality finishes of
the whole site is noted by those visiting. The outside of the affordable units are indistinguishable from
those of market rate units. David Armitage, Director of Design and Construction at POUA, who lives
within the development, said he often forgets which units are market and which are affordable although
he was involved in its development. The Fair Housing Act also forbids developers and managers to reveal
which units are subsidized.
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Although all tenants are told that this is mixed income community at initial lease-up and condominium
documents are explicit in stating this, it is interesting to note that a few tenants did not understand what
that meant. They did not understand what a Section 8 Voucher is or that some of the units were
"affordable" until they actually moved in. These tenants were initially panicked, but once the informal
interactions began, not many problems have been reported.
Armitage said that if ten individuals came interested in the market rate units, seven would walk away
once they found out there are subsidized affordable units on the premise. The three that stayed would be
very interested in learning more about the project or were ambivalent. One would buy. People who buy
the condominiums buy because they see it as real investments more so than for social reasons. In fact, the
units that originally sold for approximately $750,000 were resold for over one million in 2006. Those
who choose to stay or leave is not because of the mixed-income nature of the development but rather
because of the location of the development in the South End, a highly desirable neighborhood.
In terms of the moderate rate units, they were fairly allocated by a lottery system that was overseen by the
city of Boston and the commonwealth of Massachusetts. Of the 1500 requests for applications, 500
actually applied with prequalification letters from lenders. Preference was given to those who lived and/or
worked in the South End.
The low-income unit tenants are from the Boston Housing Authorities (BHA) list and the management
company Maloney Properties has no say in who to accept. BHA requires that those in the low-income
units be formerly homeless or on the verge of homelessness, one of the hardest subgroups of the low-
income tier. BHA screens their own personally managed list and performs criminal checks, credit checks,
landlord verifications and assets, as well as personal interviews. According to the property manager of
Maloney Properties, filling these units has been a challenge. Although BHA has a long waiting list for
these types of units, going through the bureaucratic BHA system slowed down the process of occupying
these units.
Management and Operations
Maloney Properties is a private property management company hired to maintain both the for-sale and
subsidized units. They specialize in mixed-income projects developed by non-profit groups and have over
8,000 units of affordable housing in their portfolio. The properties they manage are either fully subsidized
or mixed income and are inline with their mission. As an overall management approach, Maloney
Properties believes it must always provide good upkeep and amenities of the highest quality.
A source of tension arose when one building had a disproportionately higher number of affordable units
within. Typically, buildings have approximately 15 percent of units affordable but the one in question had
20 percent of the units affordable.
Sue Johnson, Vice President and Regional Manager at Maloney Properties, said that mixed-income
housing projects like Rollins Square must have behavioral standards for their tenants held to the level of
very high income developments. There is very little difference in adherence to these rules amongst the
tenants of different income tiers. In fact, some rules are more prevalently broken by market rate
condominium owners - for example, they decorate their julienne balconies with plants that hang over the
railings, breaking a rule and posing a safety concern. Violations that relate to pet ownership are
commonly attributed to market rate owners as well. Complaints about noise seem to be distributed evenly
amongst income levels. Behavioral complaints are attributed twice as likely to subsidized units but this
number remains fairly low - the complaints really only come when children, who are most prevalent in
subsidized households, are just off for summer break and the time right before school starts. Leases are
strictly enforced and very little resistance exists being that this is a new development with households not
being accustomed to another system. Very few evictions occurred. Since its opening, only one eviction
went all the way through and five are being processed; all of which were within the affordable units. The
usual avenue for conflict resolution is to first work directly with the tenant. If no resolution is found,
management then goes to court. The tenant is given a second chance in the meantime. If the problem is
still not resolved, the eviction process is followed through.
Turnover rates remain very low. The low-income households that leave are usually because they found
another location closer to their family. Only one moderate-income condominium has turned over. Of the
market-rate buyers, only two complained about the project being a mixed-income development. Upon
further questioning, the buyers were really complaining about the urban environment in which the
development is situated in; they were transplants from the suburb who really were not used to communal
amenities or higher density living. In general, most residents seem to love the development.
In terms of governance, all tenants are encouraged to participate in Board meetings and become
representatives. The board is very active and is made up many very educated, sophisticated residents. This
composition was really "the luck of the draw" and depends really on who is leaving and who is willing.
However, much of the participation has come from the market-rate tenants who have a vested financial
interest in the development. Johnson conjectured the low participation of the subsidized households may
be attributed to them feeling they have less and are embarrassed to participate. Training was provided for
the board members.
One of the most unique features of Rollins Square is the decision on the amount of condominium fees
paid. Before construction completion, each unit's prorated share of operating expenses was determined by
an outside real estate appraisal agency based on the market value of the unit, not the income of the future
resident. This meant subsidized units paid according to the same standards as market rate units. The
reasoning behind this structure is to decrease the potential for social tensions. This was a great marketing
tool to show potential tenants that the management is fair. Discussions had occurred about lowering
condominium fees for moderate income households on a statewide policy level, but much pushback came
from developers.
In terms of budgets, there are actually two: one for the low and moderate income units and one for the
market rate units. All units pay for common expenses (e.g. chillers, corridor repairs, landscaping, carpet
cleaning, landscaping) with amounts set based on their beneficial interest.
A limited partnership was established to pay the fees for the 37 low-income units. The operating account
pays for all maintenance and management of the whole complex.
Challenges to working with those low income is that many do not have the common necessities needed to
maintain a home such as a vacuum cleaner and plunger or even blinds. When placed in penthouse units,
some low-income families are taken aback by the new luxuries but suffice it to say, they became
accustomed quickly. Many of the low-income applicants are very young single mothers. The most
successful transitions are the tenants who come from shelters that provide follow-up care and teach how
to live independently. Currently, Maloney Properties gives social service references but do not have the
capacity or expertise to provide it themselves. Social services for the 37 low-income units are not part of
the LLC budget and the small number of low-income families makes it hard to provide services. Although
not in the budget, management does spend time dealing with referral services. Salaries were originally
split between the market and subsidized units but when management realized more time was spent on the
low-income units, adjustments were made. Right now, time spent on the low-income units is: 15% of the
project manager time, 10% of the administrative assistant's time, and 20 percent of the superintendent's
time. This means that if the property manager has a salary of $100,000, 20 percent would automatically
be allocated to the low-income units (they account for 20 percent of all units) and then an extra 15 percent
is added on top of that amount (paid for by the LLC) for a total of $35,000 of her salary being spent on
the low-income units. Increasing condominium fees is an option being explored although it seems rather
unpopular. The Metropolitan Housing Partnership is currently trying to help fill the social service void
temporarily. The provide trainings in paying rent on time, private finance and budgeting, tenant rights and
responsibilities, as well as basic housekeeping skills. However, tenants cannot be required to take these
trainings. Given the many social and resource needs of this very low-income population that cannot be
provided for, Johnson asserts, "I think its (including formerly homeless and on the verge of homeless
households) the worse set-up for mixed income housing." In addition, lifestyles vary tremendously and
can be a source of contention. There are many individuals who fall in the low-income category but the
current population may be best served in developments better equipped with social services rather than an
independent living, mixed-income development like Rollins Square. If done differently, more diversity
within the low-income population should be sought.
When asked whether or not management would be easier if the affordable units were concentrated in one
building or not distributed at such a high resolution, Sue John really did not think so. She asserts, "It is
not that much harder to manage a fully mixed development. Not mixing decreases the weight low-income
residents have on the condominium association." Based on conversations with Sue, she as well as her
staff really believes in the mission and benefits of a mixed-income development.
4.1.2 Summary
Key Factors:
1. Located in urban area with high real estate prices
2. Boston's amendment of its zoning ordinance to establish a linkage ordinance
3. Located in area with mix of low income and luxury housing; rapid gentrification
4. Considerable neighborhood and citywide support existed for the development of the Rollins
Square
5. Early meetings with community groups (city of Boston Died)
6. Efficient approval process because developers agreed with community and city vision
7. Land value written down to 1.5 million and deferring payments till construction is done
8. 11 million in forgone developer fees to cross subsidize
Unique Characteristics:
1. POUA retained a fee ownership interest in the property until construction was completed, also
gave the developer an ultimatum to "use it or lose it."
2. POUA's mission and nonprofit status enabled the developer to internally subsidize the project's
workforce housing condominium units and forgo traditional development profits
4.2 CASE STUDY TWO: HARBOR POINT
4.2.1 Project Background
Income Mix: Harbor Point
Income Mix < 50% AMI 50-79% AMI 80-99% AMI >100% AMI
Percent 59% 14% 8% 18%
Source: Brophy and Smith, "Mixed-Income Housing: Factors for Success." 1997
Number of Units: 1,283 (883 market-rate, 400 subsidized) with modest commercial space
Placed in Service: 1988
Market: Transitional
Primary Goals: Transform blighted public housing, provide housing to low income residents, and
attract market rate tenants
Innovations: Participation of tenants in management, converting public to private ownership
Vision
Harbor Point has become the prototype for successfully
converting public housing into a privately developed mixed-
income community. In 1979, the project was still known as
Columbia Point and owned by the Boston Housing Authority.
Columbia Point had fallen into what seemed like a state of
disrepair; with crime, drugs, and vacancy victimizing the
remaining tenants. Only 350 units of the original 1,500 units remained occupied. The private developer
Corcoran, Mullins, and Jennison (CMJ) partnered with the The Harbor Point Community Task Force to
redevelop this project into what it is today, a vibrant mixed-income community. Harbor Point is located
on a peninsula in the Dorchester neighborhood of Boston. The site has spectacular waterfront views and is
next to the University of Massachusetts, Boston and the John F. Kennedy Library. CMJ saw an
opportunity to capitalize on this location and the residents wanted to see a change.
Objective
The objective was to change a blighted public housing project that had a huge concentration of low
income households into a mixed-income community. Joe Corcoran of CMJ believed that "structurally, the
BHA doesn't have the ability to manage it [public housing]. It's a bad idea to put all low-income families
with all their social problems together in one place." A key objective is to attract market-rate tenants to
the site. The target ratio was 70 percent market rate, 30 percent subsidized. The community wanted to see
all units, regardless of the income of the residents, be built and maintained at the same high quality. The
low-income units would be fully integrated with moderate- and market-rate tenants and indistinguishable
from the outside.
Project Team
The developer and tenant group, The Columbia Point Community Task Force, were 50-50 partners in
both ownership and decision-making duties. The terms of the partnership were that the tenants have 50
percent ownership control, 10 percent of the syndication proceeds, and 10 percent of the cash flow. The
Task Force participates jointly with the Boston Redevelopment Agency (BRA) and the Boston Housing
Authority (BHA) in the redevelopment, construction, and management of all new and rehabbed housing
on the peninsula, including the selection of developer.
The Columbia Point Community Task Force, representing project residents, would participate jointly with
the BRA and the BHA in the redevelopment, construction, and management of all new and rehabbed
housing on the peninsula, including developer selection.
Developer: Corcoran, Mullins, Jennison (CMJ)
Columbia Point Community Task Force
- Boston, Massachusetts
e CMJ Established in 1972
- CMJ developed several mixed-income communities at time of proposal;
including Queen Anne's Gate in Weymouth, Massachusetts - 544 units
with 25 percent low-income, 25 percent moderate-income, and 50
percent market-rate tenants - the first successful mixed-income project in
the state and one of the first in the nation. They had also transformed
America Park in Lynn, MA into a mixed-income community renamed
King's Lynne.
www.corcoranjennison.com
Development
Consultant: Antonio DiMambro
e Fiduciary agent to the Columbia Point Community Task Force
* Boston architect and planner
e Helped selection of developer and explained proposals and architect
renderings
General Contractor:
Architect:
Marketing/Sales
Suffolk Construction
e Boston, Massachusetts
e www.suffolk-construction.com
Goody, Clancy, and Associates
e Joan Good
- Boston, Massachusetts
- www.goodyclancy.com
Peabody Properties, Inc.
- Braintree, Massachusetts
- www.peabody.properties.com
Property
Management CMJ Management Company
e Boston, Massachusetts
e Currently manages nearly 25,000 units of housing, some mixed
e www.corcoranjennison.com/management/html/index.asp
Location and History
Harbor Pont is located in the Boston neighborhood of Dorchester. Although infamous for its high crime
rates, Dorchester is located right on the waterfront and is close to downtown Boston with its educational
and employment opportunities. The site itself is located on a peninsula and is separated form the rest of
the Dorchester community by a roadway. This natural barrier worked to the advantage of the developers
in isolating the site from the rest of Dorchester and arguably, the crime or the perception of it. These
assets made it possible for CMJ to create a sustainable, mixed-income community. CMJ paid extreme
attention to making the units, community, and amenities attractive to market-rate tenants. Amenities that
market-rate tenants would be hard-pressed to find at the same price in downtown Boston include: a
swimming pool, gym, and free parking. There is no mixed-income community without market-rate
tenants and much of the efforts were focused on this population.
The conversion of Columbia Point is really a story of persistence by the developer and the tenants.
Tenants of Columbia Point really pushed for the transition and are now residents of Harbor Point. The
tenant group and the private CMJ development company partnered together in a joint venture called The
Harbor Point Apartment Company in 1986. They wanted to produce a mixed-income development
consisting of 70 percent market-rate housing and 30 percent subsidized housing. The plan specified that
no more than half of the residents in a building could be low-income tenants out of fear that poverty will
be concentrated. Buildings were either demolished or renovated. CMJ ultimately won the bid for
development rights because it had the established relationships with the tenants.
Development Approach
The developers CMJ believed that market-rate tenants would live next to
low-income tenants if the development was built and managed as if it were
a market-rate project. CMJ believed that the formula for success was
simple and it entailed appealing to the sensibilities and desires of the
market-rate buyers: "build the best apartments, have the best landscaping,
provide amenities like swimming pools and tennis courts, and make sure
the pricing is correct."79
Income Mix
The 400 subsidized units had rents that ranged between $863 (one-bedroom) to $1,139 (four-bedrooms).
Residents in the subsidized units were either enrolled in HUD's Section 8 voucher program or a similar
State program that only required them to pay 35 percent of their income. If a person had no income, they
paid nothing. The 883 market-rate units had rents that ranged between $795 (one-bedroom) to $1,395
(three-bedrooms). The rental subsidies actually allowed for the market-rate units be offer competitive
rents.80
In terms of demographics, market-tenants ranged from students to working professionals who are
ethnically and racially diverse. Very few of these households had children. This population's income
affords them choice and thus understandably, the turnover rate is almost 50 percent. The subsidized units
contrasted demographically from the market rates units. Most were minority families with children. The
median income for the tenants of subsidized units was only a quarter of the median income of market-rate
tenants ($41,000). There is a huge gap between these two groups in terms of income as well as household
make-up.
The ratio of 70 percent market-rate units and 30 percent subsidized units does not take advantage of the
market for units in between these two extremes. A void for moderate-income housing exists but
understandably, this population was probably not served because no financing or subsidy was available
for this group. Harbor Point is still located in the transitional neighborhood of Dorchester and cannot
command luxury rents to utilize a cross-subsidy approach.
Financial Structure
The total development cost was $250 million and required what at the time seemed like complex
financing. A series of large loans and grants were issued. The State contributed $154 million in loans and
grants. HUD gave an Urban Development Action Grant of $12 million and an Urban Initiative loan of $9
million. $75 million was from equity. Federal and State programs provided operating subsidies on an
ongoing basis.
Financing
MHFA co-insured loan $121,000,000
MHFA supplemental loan $30,000,000
Urban initiatives Loan $9,000,000
UDAG loan $12,000,000
State Chapter 884 grant $3,000,000
Investor equity $75,000,000
Total $250,000,000
Critics of the project point to it being abnormally expensive to produce. However, when compared to two
other projects constructed at the same time, Harbor Point actually emerged the lowest priced.
Harbor Point - $144,523 per unit
BHA's D Street - $145,263 per unit
Tent City - $154,673 per unit
Other critics continued in saying that this new development meant a loss of 1,200 units of affordable
housing. However Corcoran argued that 400 quality, livable units were gained through this process. The
site could never have accommodated that many units of low-income households without deteriorating to
what it was in 1979.
Development Costs
Demolition $5,850,000
Building construction $106,850,000
Site work/landscaping $12,740,000
Earthwork/piles $7,900,000
General conditions/bonds $9,535,000
Surveys, permits, testing $3,155,000
Architecture/Engineering $5,350,000
Construction interest $29,655,000
Taxes/insurance $1,490,000
Financing fees $2,065,000
Legal/title $2,050,000
Relocation/social services $3,495,000
Marketing $2,340,000
Operating reserve account $57,525,000
TOTAL $250,000,000
Project Design, Design Approach, Physical Layout of Units
The community expressed at the beginning of the
planning process the importance of fully
integrating the low-income units with the market
rate units. Harbor Point was originally built in
phases starting in the South End. They understood
why the first section had to be a proportionate mix
and how many low-income residents had to live in
their old homes until market tenants were
attracted. The community understood the concept
of mixed-income housing.
With all being done however, the actual layout of the units has caused some level of segregation within
Harbor Point. The three- and four-bedroom townhouses were all located on the periphery of the project.
Because most of these units were subsidized, low-income tenants were thus concentrated on the outskirts
of the development. Market-rate tenants who had once occupied the townhouse units gradually moved
towards the mid-rise and high-rise buildings with the smaller units, further separating the project based on
income groups. One townhouse section had become so skewed that the ratio of subsidized to market-rate
units was 15 to 1. This trend runs counter to the goal of creating a mixed-income community.
Furthermore, it seems to have even increased the social tensions between the two
Marketing
Harbor Point was never referenced as being in Dorchester during the marketing of the units. Rather, it
was targeted to those not local to Boston as being a hop, skip away from downtown Boston. Directions to
Harbor Point were purposely left out of ads in the Boston Globe. Leasing agents feared Dorchester's
negative image of having high-crime rates would deter prospective tenants from even visiting. Thus, the
leasing staff invited tenants over without telling them the exact location of the site. Leasing agents would
bring prospective renters into Harbor Point using the scenic road along the coast rather than on Mount
Vernon. As Joe Corcoran expressed, "the approach was all important." When people came to the site, the
first thing they saw was this new building, the ocean, this great routing along the University of
Massachusetts and the water. And they came right into the development. So at the outset they saw the full
potential of the site." 82
In terms of creating a new community isolated form
Dorchester, natural and man-made barriers made that feasible. T 60STh
Harbor Point is separated form Dorchester by a highway and is
surrounded by water on its three other sides. The approach to
marketing Harbor Point is to treat it like a market-rate
development and concentrate on presenting only the appealing
aspects. Agents focused on water access, proximity to mass
transportation, newly renovated units, free parking, and fitness
center. Also, the leasing staff really emphasized Harbor Point
as a good "bang for the buck" in comparison to developments
in Boston with the same amenities.
Leasing agents disclosed that development was a mixed-
income one but they did not emphasize it in any of their
marketing. Market-rate renters seemed rather ambivalent when
told. Approximately 10 percent of prospective buyers were
immediately turned off.83 One year after leasing began, reports
surfaced that some market-rate tenants did not know they were living in a mixed-income community until
they read the newspaper. Some market-rate tenants were confused and thought they were directly
subsidizing the rents of low-income families. And then rumors spread amongst low-income residents that
the developers were trying to kick them out. There was a time when the concept of mixed-income housing
was muddled and caused a certain level of social tensions.
Management and Operations
Harbor Point is unique in that it relocated past residents back into the new development. Wendell Yee,
manager at Harbor Point, recalls the challenges of implementing new management rules, "It was not an
easy task to go in and say, 'The rules are changing.' It was transitioning people from no rules to a set of
standards that that they had to live by in order to be able to move into the new community. Some of the
families realized that they were not going to be able to live within those parameters and they moved out
voluntarily. As the agent for the housing authority we went in there and we enforced the rules and the
lease - something the housing authority never did."8 4
Management's strict enforcement of policy really relied on the full support of the tenant task force. The
crackdown on drugs was a long process that exemplified this partnership. Another key issue that had to be
addressed was the collection of rent. The issue of fairness was raised. Some said it was unfair to evict
tenants who did not pay because they were never expected or enforced to. However, of the 30 or so
people who didn't pay rent, there were still 320 families who consistently paid it month after month. The
tenant-developer partnership decided together on putting those with arrears on a repayment plan; they
eventually collected 95 percent of rent owed.85
Commitment to maintain Harbor Point in its brand new condition was expected of all residents.
Management really depended on residents to enforce social norms and act as guardians of their
development. Building captains were enlisted to act as a liaison between management and tenants.
Some subsidized tenants resented the new rules and had theories that they were targeted at the subsidized
tenants to drive them out. Rules like no washing or repairing cars, no sitting on the front stoop, or no loud
noise between 11 and 8 seemed to be specifically made to accommodate market-residents and burden
86low-income residents. Social tensions were heightened. However, these conspiracy seemed unfounded
given of the 350 Columbia Point families that had been rehoused, 220 remained nearly ten years later.
87This means there was an attrition of only 3.88 percent per year.
The eviction rate of market rate and subsidized residents has been similar. In 1998, 34 tenants were
evicted. Of those, 25 were market rate tenants while 9 were subsidized tenants. This represents 3% of
market rate tenants and 2% of subsidized tenants. Nonpayment of rent was the main reason for the
evictions.88
Today, nearly 100 percent of units at Harbor Point are occupied. Overall, the developer CMJ and the task
force fundamentally believe that that Harbor Point is successful in being attractive, well-managed, and
fiscally sound.
4.2.2 Summary
Key Factors:
1. 50-50 partnership between tenant group and private developer
2. Developer had experience in developing mixed income community and development team
committed to idea
3. Design and amenities were comparable to those offered in conventional market- rate
developments.
4. Location solid enough to attract market-rate renters
5. Strong professional management and the support of tenants made the transition successful
6. On-site private social service programs help families transition form public to private housing and
provide ongoing support
Unique:
1. conversion of public housing to private mixed-income development
4.3 CASE STUDY THREE: THE METROPOLITAN
4.31 Project Background
Number of Units:
Placed in Service:
Market:
Primary Goals:
Innovations:
251 units with community, commercial, and retail space; 283 spaces in
75,000 square foot parking garage
2004
Tight
Increase moderate-income homeownership and very-low to low-income rental
housing; high percentage of affordable units
Cross-subsidization by luxury condominiums within one building;
Partnership between private developer and nonprofit developer
Complex financing
Vision
The Metropolitan's programming responds aggressively to the
5% owner-occupancy rate in Chinatown and the increasing cost
of housing in Boston's downtown area. Working jointly with the
private developer Edward A. Fish Associates (EAFA), the
nonprofit Asian Community
Development Corporation pursued a development strategy that
maximized affordability in the building by capitalizing on the
assets that come from being situated in the Chinatown
neighborhood of the downtown core. The development benefited
from convenient transit access, increased density, and the ability
of market-rate condominiums to internally cross-subsidize the
Income Mix: The Metropolitan
Income Mix < 30% AMI 30-60% AMI 80-120% AMI Market
Percent 14% 18% 14% 52%
Units 35 rental 46 rental 34 condo 52 rental;
84 condo
affordable units at a rate far beyond the City of Boston's own Inclusionary Zoning levels. The
Metropolitan is a mixed-use, high-rise tower containing 251 rental and for-sale units. 115 of these units,
or almost half of the total units, are affordable to low- and moderate-income households. The 23 story
building also houses four non-profit organizations and 2,400 square feet of community meeting space.
Objective
The objectives for developing the Metropolitan were shaped by resident concerns expressed within The
Chinatown Master Plan as well as the non-profit development partner's mission: to serve the Asian
American community of Greater Boston with an emphasis on preserving and revitalizing Boston's
Chinatown. The low five percent rate of homeownership in Chinatown was a cause of concern. Moderate-
income households were increasingly being priced out of the booming Boston residential market of the
early 2000s. Upon completion, the Metropolitan single-handedly doubled homeownership rates in
Chinatown to 10 percent. The second goal was to maximize the number and quality of housing units
affordable to households that have very-low- to moderate incomes while creating a sustainable mixed-
income community. Nearly half of the units within the Metropolitan carry a form of income restriction.
Project Team
The development team is a partnership between a for-profit and a non-profit entity. The for-profit team
offered development expertise as well as equity while the non-profit was instrumental in the community
and permitting process during predevelopment.
Developer: Parcel C Limited Partnership - A joint venture between:
Asian Community Development Corporation (ACDC)
e Boston, Massachusetts
e Established in 1987
e Developed Oak Terrace, an 88-unit mixed-income project with over 300
residents; partnered with New Boston Development Partners to win bid
to redevelop Parcel 24 into $120 million mixed income project in 2006
e Specializes in private partnerships
e 501(c)(3) nonprofit housing developer based in Chinatown
- www.asiancdc.org
Edward A. Fish Associates, LLC (EAF)
e Braintree, Massachusetts
e Established in 1968
- Private firm experienced in affordable housing development in markets
with high barriers to entry
e $1.0 billion of developments
- www.eafish.com
Development
Consultant:
General Contractor:
Architect:
Marketing/Sales/
Management
Peter Munkenbeck
e Boston, Massachusetts
- Works with nonprofits on project and organizational consulting
- Over twenty years of experience in affordable housing development
Suffolk Construction Company, Inc.
- Boston, Massachusetts
e www.suffolk-construction.com
The Architectural Team, Inc.
e Chelsea, Massachusetts
- Established in 1971
e www.architecturalteam.com
Peabody Properties, Inc.
* Braintree, Massachusetts
- Established in 1976, owned by Edward A. Fish
e www.peabody.properties.com
Location and History
Since the late 1980s, activists and developers have fought
over Parcel C, a city block in Boston's Chinatown. Tufts- Stree,
New England Medical Center (NEMC) tried unsuccessfully
three times to build a parking lot on the land while residents
demanded a community center. The Boston Redevelopment r
Agency approved the Chinatown Master Plan in 1990,
reserving the parcel for community use and rezoned it as
residential property. However, the BRA and the Chinatown
Neighborhood Council approved NEMC's proposal to buy
Parcel C despite protests. In 1994, the City terminated
NEMC's approved proposal to build the parking lot when
faced with strong community pushback. Hundreds of
residents became active around preserving the parcel. Parcel
C was eventually redesignated for community use. The
following year, the BRA released a Request for Proposal for
Parcel C. Edward A. Fish Associates (EAF) working with the Asian Community Development
Corporation (ACDC) was the successful respondent. The community approved of the EAF/ACDC
development team at a community meeting as the developer of Parcel C.
Parcel C is located in the Chinatown neighborhood of
Boston, a few minutes walk away from Downtown. The site
is well-serviced by public transportation: the orange and
silver line stations are two blocks away and the South Station
head house offers connections to the red line as well as
regional transportation. Chinatown itself is a historic
neighborhood bordered by the trendy South End
neighborhood, the diminishing Leather District, as well as
the Theatre District. Washington Street is one of the main thoroughfares and was once known as the
"Combat Zone" for the high rate of violence and prostitution along that street. Today, Chinatown has
become a rapidly gentrifying community, with luxury condominiums being feverishly built by private
developers to capitalize on the location near Downtown Retail, Financial, and Theatre District amenities.
Chinatown is one of Boston's densest residential districts, with over 28,000 persons per square mile.
Almost three quarters of Chinatown's population is of Asian decent, with a median household income of
$14,289. Chinatown continues to have one of the lowest incomes in the city of Boston.
NDevelop2ment App~roach
Community feedback and support was crucial to the success of this process as the project emerged out of
grassroots organizing. Both Edward A. Fish, Associates (EAP) and Asian Community Development
Corporation (ACDC) have a long history of affordable housing development. Because ACDC has been
working in the Chinatown neighborhood for decades, the developers were able to effectively negotiate
with the neighborhood activists. Even when the height of the project surpassed community expectations,
the Chinese Progressive Association did not hold any protests that usually accompany the development of
luxury condominiums in Boston.
Seeing the Metropolitan tried to address community concerns, the community expectations articulated in
the 2000 Chinatown is worth stating. The following expectations were expressed by focus group
participants and key informants:
- Preserving the affordable housing stock that currently exists
- Expanding the inventories of affordable, low and moderate income, and mixed rate housing
- Creating home ownership opportunities
- Creating new housing that accommodates larger families
- Helping homeowners to rehabilitate and upgrade their properties and available housing stock
Innovations in Financial Structure
The controversial increase in the height of the building actually paid for the relatively high percentage of
affordable units. City Councilmember Sam Yoon, the former Director of Housing at ACDC, said, "In a
downtown location, the higher up you go, the more you get for condos. To make the numbers work, there
had to be condos that you could sell for $400 to $500 a square foot, and even more."89 The market rate
luxury condominiums internally subsidized the affordable units. $50 million of the project's $89 million
development costs are paid by the revenues from the affordable and market-rate condominium sales.
The 283 parking spaces located in an underground parking structure offer another source of revenue. The
spaces were sold for another $6.5 million. Pre-construction sales allowed an inflow of cash that decreased
the need for initial equity. 4,000 square feet of office space was sold to local community groups for an
additional $1.5 million.
The Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MassHousing) once remarked that the Metropolitan has one
of the most complex financing schemes in the United States for mixed income housing. The following are
a few tables to demonstrate this point.
Revenue Model for the Metropolitan
Below Grad. Parking:
For Sale 146 Spaces @ S 45,000
Market Montly Rental 93 Spaces @ S 325
Subsidized Monthly Rental 44 Spaces @ S 50
Market Daily Rental* 55 Spaces @ S 15
Subisized Daily Rental* 12 Spaces @ S -
Total 350 Spaces
*Total Garage Capacity equals 283 spaces.
Day Parking is absorbed into garage operations.
Rent Revenue Zero BR One BR Two BR Three BR
Affordable (Assisted) S 975 $ - S - S
Affordable (30% AMI) S 560 $ 343 S - S -
Affordable (60% AMI) S 735 $ 762 S 917 S 1,059
Market Rate S - $ 1,685 S 2,225 S 2,600
*Equals Tax Credit Rent less a utity allowance of 21 (studio), 25, 28 and $33 respectively
Sources
Sour ces of Capital
LIHTC (Federal) (3 rounds) $7,748,024
Total Federal $7,748,024
Affordable Housing Trust (State) $2,000,000
State HOME $750,000
Total State $2,750,000
City HOMEICDBG $1,500,000
City Demolition Contribution $300,000
Linkage (Millennium) $1,810,758
BRA Funding $750,000
Total City- $4,360,758
Net Condo Sales $49,406,810
Net Parking Sales $6,533,500
Net Commercial Sales $1,304,135
Total Sales $57,244,445
Perm Loan - Residential $12,408,000
Perm Loan - Parking $3,450,000
Total Perm Loan t $15,858,0001
LGRAND TOTALI $87,961,227
Uses
FSot A os 0- - -
USE OF FUNDS
.__ . ....
Hard Costs $5-8,911,603
BCNG/YES/Comm Space $5,485,397
C _NC/YES Terp Relocation $620,580
Builders Risk Insurance $140,000
Building Permit $50,000
Utility Co. Backcharges $50,0001
Hard Cost Contingency $1,187,558
Total Hard Costs 4 $66,808,138
FIId Acusto CIINU0,00
~Construction Period Inter
Lease-up Period Interest
~Construction/Oper. Rese
Financing Fees
Appraisal
Mortgage Insurance
_enders Inspection
Tax Credit Fees
[Lease-up Reseres
Developer Fee
Total Financing Cost
et $2,892,670;
$515,003'
re $1,000,000
$9-08, 017
$150,0
$350,000
140,7
$178,665i
$250,0005
$,$4,400,000
$10,785,063]
Permitting Consultant $97,624
Surey $50,000
Traffic Engineer $60,000
Parking Engineer $35,500
Environmental Engineer $225,000]
fGeotechnical Engineer
Civil Engineer
Historic Consultant __
$100,000
$5, 000
$15,000
$45,695
$2,400,0001
$80,000
$500,000
$65,000
$120,000
$50,0001
$275,000
$1,000
$105,000
$100,000
$680,0001
$1,500,000
$200,000
$6,754,819
Wind/Air/Noise Studies
iArchitecture andEngineering
Permits and Approval
Legal
Accounting / Auditing
Insurance
IBCNC/BYES Relocation
RE Taxes and Tregor Tax
Tfraffic Mitigation --
Clerk / Inspector
Marketing_
'Project Management & OH
Soft and Financial Cost Contingency
Total Soft Cost
Total Use of Funds: $85,293,018
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Project Design, Design Approach, Physical Layout of Units
The floors plans and fixtures of the affordable rental apartments do not differ from the luxury rentals.
However, there is a big difference between the rental apartments and the condominium units, which are
set on the building's top 14 floors and have their own separate set of elevators.90 The goal was to provide
as many units of quality affordable housing as possible. Beyond having indistinguishable exterior doors,
the developer did not see having the same amenities in each unit is an issue of fairness or equality but
rather of priorities. Maximizing the number of units meant that affordable units would progressively get
fewer in number the higher up the floors. No affordable units are located on the penthouse floor. The
affordable units were stacked in a tiered cake formation.
Rental Units (2" through 9*' Floors)
Owned by Rental LLC, whose members are: Sun Yi LLC (0% interest), and EAF
Affiliates (100% interest). Rental LLC is the borrower with respect to MassHousing and
.. ...... .othrdehdD.o,the rentals.
Affordable Rentals (scattered throughout) ----------------------------
Market Rentals (scattered throughout)
Owned by Community LLC*, whose
members are: Sun Yi LLC (.01% Owned by Metro LLC*, whose
interest), EAF Affiliate (.01%), Tax Credit members are EAF Affiliates (100%
Investor (99.98%). interest).
EAF Affiliates owns the
ACDCoBRA owns office space rest of the commercial
ACDCw owc to be leased to YES and space. They may furtherits own office the Community Room subdivide the space and
space LLC. create more commercial
condos for community
agencies.
Garage Condo - Owned by EAF Affiliate. Parking rights will be granted using easements
(to the BRA for YES, to BCNC, to residential owners who purchase spaces, 44 spaces for
Oak Terrace, and other Chinatown and Bay Village residents.).
*These entities will be unrecorded,
but will be bound by legal
agreements.
For Sale Condos (10th through 23"' Floors)
Individual units (affordable and market-rate) are owned by individual owners.
Source: Presentation by Douglas Ling to the National CAPACD Convention, Los Angeles, May 20, 2004. "The
Metropolitan on Parcel C: Reaching New Heights for Mixed-Income/Mixed-Use Development"
Marketing
The website for the metropolitan, www.themetropolitan.com, describes the project as follows:
"Metropolitan, Boston's Newest Premier Residence, is located in the heart
of the city's vibrant theater district and steps away from fine dining,
downtown shopping, and world renowned cultural, educational, and health
institutions. Featuring 24 hour concierge services, parking, and a variety
of residence models and enrichment amenities tailored to your needs. The
new lifestyle you have been dreaming of is ready now at The
Metropolitan."
A broker mentioned that the Metropolitan is not the Ritz Carlton, but it
provides downtown living and views and that's worth it. Although the
project came from a grassroots movement to provide affordable housing
targeted to current Chinatown residents, nowhere is there a mention of this
history. The development is described as being in the theater district and
emphasizes downtown living as well as wonderful views. The marketing strategy for the
Metropolitan is really to market it as any other luxury high-rise development in the
downtown area. This approach proved to be rather successful. Units originally sold
slowly when the project opened in February of 2004. However, once schools were out in
May, the sales picked-up rapidly and all units were sold within a year. Occupancy
continues to be 100%.
Both the marketing company Peabody Properties and various brokers said they disclose to potential
tenants that the Metropolitan is a mixed-income community but do not emphasize it. The questions and
statements that lead to disclosure are telling - the property manager Adam Kearney asks potential tenants
whether or not they qualify for subsidized housing as a subtle way to imply that there are subsidized units
within the building. He then may say there is a "diverse" population who lives within the building. Now if
a potential tenant were to ask, he would tell whether or not there are affordable units present on a floor,
but not which point to which ones. It is assumed that most local potential tenants know that any
development, including market rate, needs to include 10% affordable units. Contracts undoubtedly state
the mixed-income nature to the tenant but how the disclosure occurs verbally varies from broker to
broker. Peabody does not see any hesitancy to rent or buy because of the mixed-income component.
Management and Operations
The property manager from Peabody Properties says he cannot even count one conflict between
affordable and market rate tenants because of social tensions. He asserts that this is a testament to the
careful screening of the residents who do exist. Applicants are subjected to an in-depth application
process. For market rate units, a reference check and financial information is gathered. The Boston
Housing Authority (BHA) is responsible for fully checking the rental applicants and thus removes the
screening power from the management. Evictions have been really low. Only one has occurred since
December 2004 for nonpayment of rent.
Tenants mostly seem to stay to themselves and remain relatively private. A computer learning center
exists as well as various classes were offered. Attempts to encourage socializing with pizza and drinks
have not been greatly successful. It should also be again noted that there are separate elevators for
condominium and rental units. Encouraging interactions was not a major priority if based on the current
level of socialization within.
In terms of the governance structure, a primary board exists that oversee the residential board of nine.
There are 9 primary members, each representing a different component (e.g. garage, market-rate unit, tax-
credit unit). The residential board is comprised of 4 market-rate residents and one affordable unit resident.
Condominium fees are determined by an equation that is a percentage of the price of ownership. This
means that households in the affordable homeownership units pay less than those in the market rate units.
Conflict about fairness has not risen about this point
4.3.2 Summary
Key Factors:
1. Located in urban area with high real estate prices
2. Considerable neighborhood and citywide support existed for
the development
3. Nonprofit developer a member of the community with
mobilizing capabilities
4. Efficient approval process because developers agreed with
community and city vision
5. Nonprofit developer willing to forgo some profit for more subsidized units
6. High quality development
4.4 FINDINGS FROM CASE STUDIES
Clearly stating each development's goal as well as the reason for the mixed-income agenda is critical to
understanding the elements that make mixed-income projects successful. Rollins Square, Harbor Point,
and the Metropolitan are projects with varied problems and objectives. Each project is viewed by their
owners, developers, residents, and most other stakeholders as successful. From a broader perspective,
these cases suggest that mixed-income housing can, albeit to a limited degree, contribute to the goal of
desegregation. The impact a development has at the neighborhood level is limited by the relatively small
scale to which these projects operate and thus, should be one amongst many concerted efforts toward
desegregation.
A mixed-income project's success can be determined only after the intended results are clearly
articulated. Rosenbaum, Stroh, and Flynn's study on Lake Parc Place in Chicago showed that the project
successfully attracted moderate-income working households to create a mixed-income environment.91
However, the project did not meet its other goals of increasing social interactions across income groups
and raising the employment rate of low-income residents.
The three projects studied share common characteristics amongst each other and support findings of
recent research, particularly those in Paul C. Brophy's "Mixed-Income Housing: Factors for Success."
The following common factors of the surveyed projects are detailed with reference to findings of the
aforementioned article and other literature researched.
4.4.1 Mixed-income housing should follow basic rules of real estate development (location, design,
financial feasibility) and management.92
A mixed-income housing project is fundamentally a real estate development product. Thus, a successful
mixed-income development should follow the basic rules of real estate development and property
management.
Desirable Location Boston, Massachusetts has a strong housing market capable of attracting mobile
upper-income households. Although the three cases all benefited from this overall market assessment, the
nuances of each location within the city should be highlighted for the different assets and challenges it
presents each project. Rollins Square and the Metropolitan are both located near the desirable downtown
area of the city, where luxury market-rate housing is continually being built and sold quickly. Harbor
Point however is located in Dorchester, a neighborhood locally known for its high rates of crime and
poverty. At the time of development, Harbor Point filled a void for high-quality, market-rate housing in
the area. Creating the market for this product was riskier than entering an existing market. 93 However,
Harbor Point had numerous assets that mitigated this otherwise large risk to attracting market-rate tenants:
1) water created a boundary from the existing neighborhood and to a certain extent, its problems; 2) the
large scale of the project enabled the creation of not only a new market, but a new neighborhood; and 3)
the proximity to downtown employment and educational opportunities can attract market-rate tenants that
lack negative preconceptions of the area.
Quality Design All three projects exhibit great attention to design detail, layout, and finishings to
successfully attract market-rate residents. Market rate and subsidized units were indistinguishable from
the outside to decrease stigma against the former and in the Rollins Square project, fulfill their objective
of providing fair and equal treatment to those of lower-income.
Financial Feasibility Mixed-income projects are generally much more complicated to finance than
conventional housing projects because a multitude of funding sources are often needed to subsidize the
affordable units. In addition, the perception of heightened risk makes securing funds more difficult for
mixed-income projects. A project must accurately set aside enough funds to both build and maintain the
development in the long-term.
Strong Property Management Strong property management is a critical component of each of the
projects surveyed. Not coincidentally, all three projects hired professional management companies to
ensure the upkeep of the facilities and grounds as well as enforcement of tenancy rules. Evictions and
complaints are not noticeably more frequent with subsidized units. The level of management is at least
equal to the management of developments with all market-rate units. With that said, public-sector and
non-profit developers are not inherently excluded from the property management role as long as they
have extensive experience providing this level of service, which they often do not. Of the property
managers interviewed, all subscribed to Wilson and Kelling's "broke windows theory" made famous by
Gladwell's book, "The Tipping Point." The theory states that a broken window that is left unrepaired can
quickly encourage more vandalism because it sends a message of apathy to all who sees it.94 This may
suggest that mixed-income housing management takes more resources to maintain but further research is
necessary to support such claims. Interviews actually suggest that although low-income households may
need provisions of social services, property management expends the same amount of time and financial
resources for maintenance as they would with market-rate developments. Being attentive and quickly
correcting problems is a quality that defines good property management of any development, whether
mixed-income or not. Strong property management however may be more critical to the long-term
sustainability of these projects.
4.4.2 Mixed-income housing may be more harmonious when a moderate-income tier bridges the
low- and market-rate tiers.95
Both Rollins Square and the Metropolitan have an intentional moderate-income tier, with 40 percent of all
households in the former project belonging to the moderate tier. Both projects report minimal conflict if
any between the subsidized and market-rate tenants. Harbor Point differs in that it combines a large
number of very low-income renters (23 percent) with market-rate tenants who have significantly greater
incomes. Social tensions seem higher at Harbor Point than the other developments and may suggest the
importance of having a moderate-income tier to lesson a stark income gap. Further showing the sensitivity
of social tensions to the income mix is an incident at Rollins Square when market-rate tenants discovered
their building had a disproportionate number of low-income residents. Market-rate residents began
complaining that they were being unfairly burdened and property management responded with the
reshuffling of units when possible.
A noteworthy consideration when determining the optimal tenant mixture is the demographics of the
tenant population - particularly the number of children present in each household. 9 6 In all three projects,
households with children tend to be disproportionately concentrated in the affordable units. This makes
for more recognizable distinction amongst income tiers. Rollins Square offers anecdotal evidence that
occupying market-rate units with families helps bridge the social divide through interactions amongst the
children. Susan Johnson, property manager at Rollins Square, gave an example of one family overcoming
their initial anxieties of living next to a family in a subsidized unit when the young children of the two
households began playing together. The two families are now very good friends. Harbor Point also
supports giving attention to demographic differences through a negative example. At Harbor Point,
households with children comprise approximately a quarter of all units. Most of the children are teenagers
and management continually deals with complaints that range from excessive noise and vandalism to
those concerning drugs and violence. 97 Although these problems exist in upper-income communities
social tensions between income tiers are exacerbated because the majority of these teenagers are
concentrated in the subsidized units.98
4.4.3 Mixed-income housing may need a critical mass of units occupied by higher-income
households. 99
Of the projects examined, the mix of incomes is determined by the developer's objectives, perceptions of
what would work given the market, and available financing sources. Past research has not determined an
optimal ratio of incomes and correlations have not been made between market strength and unit mix.
Mission-driven developers generally try to serve as many low-income and/or moderate-income
households as possible without jeopardizing the marketability of higher-priced units.' 00 This ratio varies
depending on the strength of the market as well as the available funding sources. However, a critical mass
of higher-income households is often necessary for internal cross-subsidization, encouragement of high
build and maintenance quality, and the deconcentration of low-income households in one locale.
4.4.4 Mixed-income housing should not emphasize the mixed-income nature of the development
during marketing.'
By law, the leasing staff is required to disclose the mixed-income nature of the project. Although leasing
staff of all three projects as well as the brokers interviewed followed disclosure rules, none emphasized
this characteristic to prospective market-rate buyers. Rather, the high-quality construction and finishings
of the project were highlighted. Rollins Square and the Metropolitan featured its central location in the
heart of Boston while Harbor Point emphasized spectacular views and proximity to the water.
Although a unit's exterior generally does not indicate the income level of the tenants within, there is no
consensus on the optimal physical layout of the development. Each project surveyed aimed to integrate
the affordable units with the market rate units, but they varied in the resolution of integration. For
example, Rollins Square located affordable units on each floor of their buildings, including the highly-
valued penthouse level. The Metropolitan spread the affordable units amongst floors in a cake-formation,
with the number of affordable units decreasing with the increasing floor number. No affordable units are
located at the penthouse level. In both projects, market rate and affordable units share entrances. Peter
Roth, a for-profit affordable housing developer, noted that the current trend is to separate entrances
between the different tenure types (rental, for-sale) as to respond to market demands.' 0 2 This idea would
not be entertained a decade ago given the emphasis on equal treatment being the only fair treatment. This
thinking seems to have softened under market pressures.
4.4.5 Mixed-income housing tenants of all income tiers need to perceive fair treatment.
In an interview, mixed-income housing developer Peter Roth emphasized the need for all tenants to feel
that they are being treated fairly to avoid social tensions. This exertion is anecdotally supported by the
case studies. All projects studied tried to incorporate residents in the governance structure although actual
participation is limited or the numbers are skewed towards market-rate tenants. In Rollins Square, all
homeowners must pay their share of operating expenses based on the market value of their unit. In other
words, subsidized units pay the same condominium fees as market rate units so the higher-income group
does not feel they are unfairly subsidizing the lower-income group. Tenants become vocal or harbor
resentment when they feel they are not being treated fairly. As mentioned earlier, market-rate tenants in
one building of Rollins Square complained when they felt there was disproportionately more affordable
housing units in their building compared to the five others. Management needs to address these issues
because the market-rate tenants have a choice in terms of where they want to live and can easily move
out. Although this is not usually the case for the tenants who are subsidized, perceptions of unfair
treatment could lead to disdain for the rules and disinvestment in the development.
5. CONCLUSION
This report examines the concept of mixing incomes in future Chinese housing developments by
illustrating the successful development and management of three cases in Boston, Massachusetts. The
intent is not to suggest the direct applicability and transplantation of the Boston models to Chinese cities.
Rather, these cases with their wide spectrum of incomes and the fine grain to which the groups were
mixed, offer an alternative to how affordable housing is currently incorporated in China. The current
trend towards greater segregation in cities like Shanghai proper can be countered with policies by the
government to incorporate more low-income and moderate income households into the urban housing
fabric of the city via mixed-income housing.
The cases presented were extreme in the sense they are extremely mixed but also they occur in a very
extreme location: liberal state, liberal city with a very sophisticated affordable housing program. I do not
recommend the exact importation of this model to Chinese cities; quite frankly, this resolution of mixing
may not be necessary. If the purpose for mixing incomes in China is only meant to decrease segregation,
mixing within a block, or mixing within a building rather than by floors may be enough. As in the Rollins
Square case, the push for extreme desegregation is often mission-focused and mission-driven and in the
United States, comes from a history of segregation. China does not share the same history. The value in
presenting these extreme cases is to show that if the extremes work, then the likelihood of more
conservative schemes working may be greater than what is currently perceived.
Implications for Chinese Cities
For government officials considering mixed income housing as a possible approach to counter the
growing segregation of urban centers, it is critical to clearly define goals and objectives. For example, the
urban center of Shanghai is obviously a high cost area. Based on experience in the United States,
understanding this market can help decipher what of all the mixed-income housing goals are feasible.
When defining goals, it is again important to understand that China has a different starting point than the
United States in terms of housing policy. Segregation may not be as big of a taboo or an issue in China
today, although policy and social changes are quick to change. As it stands, it seems that the focus is
really on how to incorporate affordable units within the center of the city, under the assumption that the
city center gives tenants access to needed infrastructure and lifestyle amenities. Based on current zoning
and the review process, overcoming community opposition to affordable housing does not seem to be a
concern since there is no formal process of intake or public review. Rather than pushing certain benefits
of mixing incomes and trying to explain why city officials should take a specific approach, this thesis
presents mixed-income developments as a doable and sustainable option without implying what the
benefits may be. The benefits are dependent on what goals are chosen.
As for private developers, building affordable housing could be a profitable venture depending on what
subsidies are made available or if cross-subsidization is plausible. Private developers should explore
mixed-income housing as an approach. Beyond profit, the more likely reason the development industry
should pay attention to mixed-income housing is that it is foreseeable that they may be required to
incorporate affordable units on-site in their future developments by the government. The central
government is keen on the issue of affordability; they have already set mandates and rules that curb
speculation and regulate the market. Unless mission-driven, achieving the social benefits of the mixed-
income approach is less of a concern to private developers as meeting the challenge of figuring out what
is the best way to incorporate required affordable units. Developers need not debate the social merits of
mixed-income housing. Rather, mixed-income housing may just be a reality given the current government
policy trend.
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